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PREVENTING EXPLOITATION AND PRESERVING 
AUTONOMY: MAKING SPRINGING POWERS OF 
ATTORNEY THE STANDARD 
John C. Craft* 
The Unifonn Power of Attorney Act was approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws in 2006. I By 
January of 2015, 17 jurisdictions had adopted the Act in some fonn.2 
The Act provides model legislation and an optional statutory power 
of attorney fonn.3 As a default, the authority of an agent under a 
power of attorney is effective immediately upon the principal's 
execution of the document.4 A principal or their attorney can draft 
against the default and make the power "springing" with the agent's 
authority being effective only upon the principal's incapacity.5 The 
statutory fonn reflects the default position and requires a principal to 
include "special instructions" if he or she chooses to make the power 
springing.6 
Springing powers of attorney should be the rule, not the exception. 
The question is not the, advisability or wisdom of a particular client 
deciding when his or her agent's authority is to commence. The 
question is: Should springing authority be the default statutory 
position? This Article answers in the affinnative, especially given 
the widespread use of fill-in-the-blank power of attorney fonns 
executed without legal counsel. This Article also recommends that 
statutory power of attorney fonns be revised allowing principals to 
* John C. Craft is a Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and overall Director of Clinical 
and Externship Programs at Faulkner University, Jones School of Law, in 
Montgomery, Alabama. He teaches and supervises the law school's Elder Law 
Clinic. Professor Craft was the inaugural chair of the legislative advocacy committee 
for the state of Alabama's Interagency Council for the Prevention of Elder Abuse. He 
thanks his Research Assistant, J. Brent Helms, for his exceptional research and 
thoughtful critique that helped shape this Article. 
1. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT, SA U.L.A. 374 (2006 & Supp. 2014). 
2. Legislative Fact Sheet Power of Attorney, UNIFORMLAWS.ORG, 
http://www.uniformlaws,orglLegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Power%20of''1020Attorn 
ey (last visited Apr. IS, 2015! 
3. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT, prefatory note, SA U.L.A. 374. 
4. Id. § 109, SB U.L.A. 196-97. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. § 301, SB U.L.A. 250-55. 
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make an informed choice between immediately effective and 
springing authority. 
These reforms serve several purposes. First, springing powers of 
attorney may prevent an agent from financially exploiting his or her 
principal. 7 Second, springing powers of attorney preserve a 
principal's autonomy, control, and independent decision making until 
help is needed (if it is ever needed), and thus support the durable 
power of attorney's role as an anticipatory document. 8 Finally, 
springing effectiveness advances the goal of promoting the use of the 
durable power of attorney as an alternative to court-supervised 
guardianship. 9 In contrast to immediately effective powers of 
attorney, principals are more likely to execute springing powers as a 
means to avoid the need for a future guardian or conservator. 10 
7. See discussion infra Part VILA-B. 
8. See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
9. See discussion infra Part VILA. 
10. See discussion infra Part VILA. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The power of attorney has been called many things, mostly 
endearing: "useful tool,,,11 "inexpensive alternative to the court 
supervision of guardianship,,,l2 "flexible[] and private,,,l3 "promoting 
autonomy and choice."l4 A few commentators are more cautious: 
"ubiquitous and powerful,,,l5 "deceptively simple."l6 The power of 
attorney has also been called a "license to steal."l7 "Durable power 
of attorney agreements often grant agents an enormous amount of 
power, including power to sell an elderly person's home and other 
assets, to make investments, to cancel insurance policies or name new 
beneficiaries, and even to empty bank accounts."l8 Moreover, agents 
under powers of attorney operate with "vast, largely unsupervised 
discretion."l9 An agent with a power of attorney "not provably void 
can take over the principal's very life. ,,20 And "in the hands of the 
wrong agent, a durable power of attorney creates enormous potential 
for abuse.,,21 
A power of attorney is "an instrument granting someone authority 
to act as agent or attorney-in-fact for the grantor.'>22 This Article 
discusses financial powers of attorney-those that give an agent the 
power to conduct financial transactions on behalf of another 
individual. At common law, applying agency principles, the 
II. Catherine Seal, Power of Attorney: Convenient Contract or Dangerous Document?, 
II MARQ. ELDER'sADVlSOR 307,309 (2010). 
12. Id. at 316. 
13. Why States Should Adopt UPOAA, UNIFORMLA WS.ORG, http://unifonnlaws.org/ 
Narrative.aspx?title=Why States Should Adopt UPOAA (last visited Apr. 18,2015). 
14. Lori A. Stiegel & Ellen VanCleave Klem, Power of Attorney Abuse: What States Can 
Do About It, AARP PUB. POL'y INST. 5 (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://assets.aarp.orglrgcenter/consume/2008_17-poa.pdf. 
15. Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden Abuses of 
Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. I, 1 (2006). 
16. Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REv. I, I (2001). 
17. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
18. Jennifer L. Rhein, Note, No One in Charge: Durable Powers of Attorney and the 
Failure to Protect Incapacitated Principals, 17 ELDER L. J. 165, 168 (2009) (citing 
Russ ex rei. Schwartz v. Russ, 734 N.W.2d 874, 888 (Wis. 2007) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring)). 
19. Kohn, supra note IS, at 17-19,22; see also Boxx, supra note 16, at 2 (stating that the 
use of durable powers of attorney "escapes most court proceedings"). 
20. Marie A. Failinger, The Paradox in Madness: Vulnerability Confronts the Law, I 
MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'y J. 127, 135 (2012). 
21. Rhein, supra note 18, at 167. 
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (8th ed. 2004). 
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authority of an agent under a power of attorney terminated upon the 
grantor's (principal's) incapacity or death.23 The rationale was that a 
person who could not make a contract himself could "not authorize 
another to make it for him. ,,24 Therefore, "an agent could not act 
under delegation of authority unless the principal had capacity to 
act.,,25 In 1954, Virginia statutorily revoked the common law 
presumption that when a principal became incapacitated his or her 
power of attorney automatically terminated.26 The concept of 
durability was born.27 A "durable" power of attorney is a "power of 
attorney that remains in effect during the grantor's incompetency.,,28 
Durable powers of attorney are advance-planning tools.29 They are 
anticipatory in nature.30 Common law powers of attorney "were of 
little use in planning for incapacity" because "[t]hey ceased to be 
effective when the principal became incompetent.,,31 Durable powers 
of attorney were developed "specifically to survive incapacity" and 
avoid the costly, time-consuming, often complicated, and 
burdensome need to petition for guardianship or conservatorship and 
the resulting court supervision over an incapacitated person's 
affairs.32 "The concept of durability," enabling an agent to act if the 
principal loses the capacity to act, "made the durable power of 
attorney the estate-planning device it is today.,,33 
Durable powers of attorney have become a standard component of 
estate planning packages prepared by lawyers.34 Studies indicate that 
durable powers of attorney are "increasingly prevalent among 
senior[s].,,35 They are an enticing planning instrument for seniors 
"who wish to protect their independence but anticipate the possibility 
of future decline in their mental or physical capacities.,,36 
23. Boxx, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
24. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 870 (1920). 
25. Seal, supra note II, at 309. 
26. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 4-6. 
27. See id. at 6-7, 10-12. 
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (8th ed. 2004). 
29. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 1-3. 
30. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501 prefatory note, 5 U.L.A. 3 (amended 1987) (stating 
the original purpose for durable powers of attorney was "to assist persons interested in 
establishing non-court regimes for the management of their affairs in the event of later 
incompetency or disability") (emphasis added). 
31. Kahn, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
32. Id. at 6; Failinger, supra note 20, at 133. 
33. Seal, supra note II, at 309. 
34. David M. English & Kimberly K. Wolff, Survey Results: Use of Durable Powers, 10 
PROB. & PROP. 33,33 (1996). 
35. Kahn, supra note 15, at 3. 
36. Id. at 2. 
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A durable power of attorney can be effective either when it is 
signed by the principal ("immediately effective") or upon the 
occurrence of a certain event ("springing" or "standby,,).37 With an 
immediately effective durable power of attorney, an agent is 
authorized to act under the power of attorney as soon as it is executed 
by the principal, and the agent's authority remains effective even if 
the principal becomes incapacitated.38 A typical springing power of 
attorney "does not activate until the principal becomes 
incompetent.,,39 Thus, an agent's authority under a springing power 
of attorney becomes effective only if the principal becomes 
incapacitated. A springing power is "designed to allow the principal 
to retain control over hislher affairs so long as slhe is competent and 
to delay the grant of authority given to [an agent] until absolutely 
necessary. ,,40 
II. ELDER FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION 
Power of attorney abuse, discussed later in Section III of this 
Article, is a type of elder financial exploitation. Elder financial 
exploitation is broadly defined as "the illegal or improper use of an 
older person's or vulnerable adult's funds, property, or assets.,,41 
Examples of elder financial exploitation include: "cashing an 
older/vulnerable person's checks without authorization or permission; 
forging [an older] person's signature; misusing or stealing [an older] 
person's money or possessions; coercing or deceiving [an older] 
person into signing [a legal] document"; and improperly using a 
"conservatorship, guardianship, or power of attomey.,,42 Elder 
37. ld. at 4; see also Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable 
Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REv. 574, 577 (1996) (framing 
immediate and springing authority as the two approaches to durability). 
38. Dessin, supra note 37, at 577. 
39. Matthew A. Christiansen, Unconscionable: Financial Exploitation of Elderly Persons 
with Dementia, 9 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 383, 403 (2008). 
40. Jonathan Federman & Meg Reed, Abuse and the Durable Power of Attorney: Options 
for Reform, GOV'T L. CTR. OF ALBANY L. SCH., Mar. 1994, at 15, available at 
http://www.albanylaw.edulglc/publications/glolDocuments/Abuse%20and%20the%20 
Durable%20Power%20of''1020Attorney%20-%200ptions%20for%20Reform.pdf. 
41. Pamela B. Teaster et aI., The 2004 Survey of State Adult Protective Services: Abuse of 
Adults 60 Years of Age and Older, NAT'L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE 10 (Feb. 2006), 
http://www .ncea.aoa. gov/Resources/Publicationidocs/2-14-
06]INAL_60_REPORT.pdf. 
42. ld. 
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financial abuse is a growing national concern.43 It has been called the 
"Crime of the 21st Century,,44 and an "epidemic.,,45 Before 
discussing power of attorney abuse specifically, this Section outlines 
the current landscape of elder financial exploitation. 
A. Prevalence of Elder Financial Exploitation 
Definitive national data on the incidence and prevalence of elder 
abuse is in short supply, due mainly to a lack of funding to support 
research.46 "Estimates of [the prevalence of elder abuse] have been 
based on sample surveys in local areas and projected to the total U.S. 
population.,,47 In one study, the National Center on Elder Abuse 
(NCEA) collected data from the 2003 fiscal year from Adult 
Protective Services (APS) in all fifty states.48 The data showed an 
increase. in reported cases of abuse of nearly 20 percent from 2000.49 
An analysis of complaints made in 19 states showed that 20.8 percent 
of investigated reports involved financial exploitation of persons age 
60 or older (14.7 percent of those reports were substantiated),50 
making financial exploitation of the elderly the third most common 
form of elder abuse. 51 
The pervasiveness of elder financial exploitation is also difficult to 
determine because it often goes unreported. 52 Numerous studies have 
been conducted attempting to estimate the number of cases never 
reported to authorities.53 In 2005, the NCEA provided estimates that 
only lout of every 25 financial exploitation cases was being 
reported, suggesting that there are at least 5 million victims subject to 
43. See Tim Devaney, Elder Financial Abuse Described as 'Epidemic,' WASH. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2012/aug/15/elder-financial-
abuse-described-as-epidemic/. 
44. Kathy Black & Kathleen Houseweart, Guests: Fight Elder Financial Abuse, HERALD-
TRIBUNE (Oct. 3, 2012, 1 :00 AM), http://www.heraldtribune.comlarticle/20121003/ 
COLUMNIST1310039999. 
45. Devaney, supra note 43 (quoting Mark Lachs, Professor of Medicine at Weill Cornell 
Medical College and Director of Geriatrics at New York-Presbyterian Healthcare 
System). 
46. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND 
EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 1-2 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace 
eds., 2003). 
47. Id. at2. 
48. Teaster et al., supra note 41, at 5. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 18. 
51. Id. at 5--6. 
52. See Fact Sheet: Elder Abuse Prevalence and Incidence, NAT'L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE 
(2005), http://www.ncea.aoa.govlResourceslPublicationidocsIFinalStatistics050331.pdf. 
53. See id. 
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financial abuse every year. 54 In 2010, a survey conducted by the 
Investor Protection Trust suggested that "[m]ore than 7.3 million 
older Americans - one out of every five citizens over the age of 65 -" 
have been victims of financial abuse.55 The number of victims could 
be even higher than that if a recent New York study is accurate.56 In 
that 2011 study, "4,156 older New Yorkers or their proxies [were] 
interviewed directly and 292 agencies reported on documented cases" 
of elder abuse. 57 The findings suggest that a mere lout of 44 cases 
of elder financial exploitation is reported to authorities.58 
Victims of elder abuse or financial exploitation may not report the 
abuse for several reasons. They may desire to keep the abuse or 
exploitation private in order to avoid embarrassment, especially if 
they have been betrayed by those persons who are closest to them. 59 
Moreover, victims who are suffering from memory loss or 
deteriorating mental capacity are less likely to speak out and report 
the abuse. 60 
B. Societal Cost of Elder Financial Exploitation 
One consequence of elder financial exploitation is a substantial, 
societal monetary cost. In 2010, researchers conducted an in-depth 
examination of 80 elder financial exploitation cases investigated by 
Adult Protective Services in Utah.61 They estimated that Utah 
seniors, businesses, and government lost more than $7 million dollars 
in 2010 as a result of the financial exploitation.62 The average loss 
54. Id. 
55. Survey: lout of 5 Older Americans are Financially Swindle Victims, Many Adult 
Children Worry about Parents' Ability to Handle Finances, INVESTOR PROTECTION 
TRUST 1 (June 15, 2010), http://www.investorprotection.orgldownloads/ 
EIFFE _Press_Release. pdf. 
56. See Under the Radar: New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study, N.Y. STATE 
OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES 2 (May 2011), 
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/mainlreportslUnder%20the%20Radar%2005%2012%201 
1 %20final%20report.pdf. 
57. ld. at l. 
58. See id. at 3. 
59. Jane A. Black, Note, The Not-So-Golden Years: Power of Attorney, Elder Abuse, and 
Why Our Laws are Failing a Vulnerable Population, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 289, 294-
95 (2008). 
60. ld. at 295. 
6l. Jilenne Gunther, The 2010 Utah Cost of Financial Exploitation, NAT'L LEGAL REs. 
CTR. 2 (2010), available at http://www.nlrc.aoa.govINLRClDocs/2010_Cost_oC 
FE_5_24_LE.pdf. 
62. ld. 
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per Utah victim was estimated to be $85,253.63 Nationally, a 2011 
MetLife study estimated the total annual loss by elders subject to 
financial abuse to be $2.9 billion dollars.64 That finding represents a 
12% increase from the $2.6 billion MetLife estimated in 2008.65 
Elder financial exploitation can also cause emotional, health, and 
quality of life consequences for the victim.66 The biggest threat to an 
elderly person is not the "unscrupulous financial expert, scam artist, 
or morally hollow caregiver.,,67 Statistics indicate that the biggest 
threat appears to be the person's family (children, grandchildren, 
siblings, nieces, and nephews).68 Because of the close relationships 
involved, victims often suffer heightened feelings of betrayal.69 
Moreover, financial exploitation can cause the elderly person to 
suffer irreparable and devastating harm.70 Indeed, the abuse often 
causes "a permanent decline in [the senior's] standard of living.,,71 
And, victims of elder abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation are 
three times more likely to die at an earlier age than elders who were 
not victims of abuse. 72 
III. POWER OF ATTORNEY ABUSE 
Modem powers of attorney are most often given with little 
supervision.73 The first effort at a uniform power of attorney law in 
1964, the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property 
Interests Act, contained a number of restrictions intended to limit the 
potential for abuse. 74 However, starting with the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1969, the focus turned to making powers of attorney less 
63. Id. at 6. 
64. The MetLife Study of Elder Financial Abuse: Crimes of Occasion, Desperation, and 
Predation Against America's Elders, METLIFE 2 (2011) [hereinafter MetLife Study], 
available at https:/ /www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/20 11 /mmi-
elder-financial-abuse. pdf. 
65. Id. 
66. How Financial Exploitation is Defined and Detected, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www .justice.gov/eldeIjusticelresearchihow-financial-exploitation-is-defined-
and-detected.html?print= 1. 
67. Black, supra note 59, at 294. 
68. Id. 
69. Sandra L. Hughes, Can Bank Tellers Tell?-Legallssues Related to Banks Reporting 
Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 293, 294 (Winter 2004). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. XinQi Dong et aI., Elder Self-Neglect and Abuse and Mortality Risk in a Community-
Dwelling Population, 302 JAMA 517, 518, 522 (2009). 
73. Boxx, supra note 16, at 45 (noting "a few state statutes [that] have addressed the lack 
of supervision"). 
74. Failinger, supra note 20, at 133-34. 
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cumbersome and promoting their use.75 As a result, "financial abuse 
of elders and others through the durable power of attorney has 
burgeoned.,,76 The durable power of attorney-the informal and 
inexpensive alternative to guardianship-can come at a cost.77 An 
agent "is able to act without any formal supervision," and "[t]his lack 
of oversight can lead to abuse" such as financial exploitation.78 
In addition to ease of use and lack of monitoring, other aspects of 
powers of attorney make them susceptible to abuse.79 
To be used effectively as a tool for planning for incapacity, 
a POA must give the agent broad decision-making authority 
over the principal's finances and property.80 [An agent's] 
authority may include the [power] to sell or mortgage the 
principal's home, withdraw and deposit money in bank and 
retirement accounts, make gifts, [and] change a principal's 
t t 1 81 es a e pan .... 
Further, durable powers of attorney can be executed with relatively 
few formalities, in most cases fewer than are required for a will.82 
Minimal execution requirements combined with the "breadth of 
power" granted to an agent create the prospect of "overreaching by 
unscrupulous agents" and the potential for abuse.83 
A. Power of Attorney Abuse - Types 
Agents under powers of attorney can abuse their authority and thus, 
exploit their principal in numerous ways.84 Professor Linda Whitton85 
75. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 10,44--45 (noting the modifications made to the Uniform 
Probate Code). 
76. Failinger, supra note 20, at 134; see also Boxx, supra note 16, at 12 (stating that 
expanding use of the durable power of attorney has "led to increased instances of 
abuse"); Kohn, supra note 15, at 9 (H[A]s the use of DPOAs has expanded, so too 
have the opportunities for their misuse and for the financial exploitation of 
principals."). 
77. Seal, supra note II, at 316. 
78. Id.at316-17. 
79. See Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
80. Id. 
8!. Id. 
82. Dessin, supra note 37, at 581-82 ("Typically, the only execution requirements are that 
the power of attorney be in writing and signed by the principal."). 
83. Id. at 582. 
84. Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance Between 
Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REv. 343, 345 (2008) [hereinafter Whitton, 
Striking a Balance]. 
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suggests three categories of power of attorney abuse.86 One category 
is "transactions that exceed the intended scope of authority" granted 
in the power of attorney.87 For example, an agent might make gifts of 
a principal's property when the power of attorney did not grant 
gifting authority.88 The second category of abuse is "transactions 
conducted for self-dealing purposes.,,89 For example, an agent might 
spend a principal's money for the agent's personal benefit rather than 
use it to pay for the principal's healthcare needs.90 The final category 
of abuse is "transactions conducted in contravention of the principal's 
expectations.,,91 For example, an agent who has gift-making 
authority might make gifts that undermine the principal's estate 
plan.92 
Other types of power of attorney abuse occur at or near the 
execution of the document. A prospective agent or other person 
might have the principal, who is cognitively impaired, sign the power 
of attorney. 93 "[A]n older person who lacks decision-making 
capacity might be persuaded or tricked into signing a [power of 
attorney]. ,,94 An unscrupulous agent might get an elderly person to 
sign a power of attorney through "deception, coercion, or undue 
influence.,,95 The principal's signature might be forced or forged,96 
"or the terms of the [power of attorney] may not reflect the 
principal's actual wishes.,,97 
85. "Professor Whitton is the Reporter for the Uniform Power of Attorney Act." See 
Linda S. Whitton Bio, VALPARAISO UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.valpo.edullaw/about-
us/full-time-faculty/linda-s-whittonlbio (last visited Apr. 18,2015). 
86. Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 84, at 345. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 355. 
89. Id. at 345. 
90. Id. at 357. 
9l. Id. at 345. 
92. See id. at 359 (discussing the case of Ronald Slomski, whose mother (his agent) 
changed the beneficiaries of Slomski's pension plan to his siblings instead of his 
stepdaughters he raised throughout their childhood). 
93. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings, in 
ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 
382,426 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003). 
94. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 4. 
95. Hafemeister, supra note 93, at 389. 
96. Id. at 388. 
97. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
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B. Prevalence of Power of Attorney Abuse 
1. Surveys of Attorneys and Professionals 
419 
One common methodology used to determine the prevalence of 
power of attorney abuse has been to survey lawyers and other 
professionals who would be aware of the problem.98 Between 1993 
and 2002, four major surveys about power of attorney abuse were 
conducted: 
In 1993, the Government Law Center of Albany Law School 
surveyed elder law attorneys, service providers, judges, and 
prosecutors. Of the 410 respondents, 94 percent believed 
that durable power of attorney abuse happened occasionally 
or frequently. Two-hundred seventy respondents (66 
percent) "had actually encountered [power of attorney] 
abuse." In 48 percent of the encounters described, 
respondents estimated that "75 rercent or more of the 
principal's assets were exploited.,,9 
In 1995, the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 
conducted a survey of over 2,000 of its members. 100 Out of the 854 
members who responded,101 40 percent "were aware of one or more 
[durable powers of attorney] that had been misused. ,,102 When power 
of attorney abuse occurs, respondents reported that it was usually 
serious; 91 percent of the cases involved the transfer of the 
principal's assets and, on average, 50 percent of the principal's 
assets. 103 
Also in 1995, the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel 
surveyed 2,711 fellows, and 776 respondents (32 percent) answered 
that they personally had knowledge of durable power of attorney 
abuse. 104 
In 2002, the Uniform Law Commission's Joint Editorial Board for 
Uniform Trust and Estate Acts surveyed probate, elder law, trust, 
98. Id. at 6. 
99. Id. at 7; accord Fedennan & Reed, supra note 40, at 39. 
100. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 7. 
101. /d. 
102. English & Wolff, supra note 34, at 33. 
103. Id. at 34. 
104. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 7; see also E. Thomas Schilling, Report on ACTEC 
Elder Law Committee Questionnaire on Possible Abuse of Financial Durable Power 
of Attorney, 21 ACTEC NOTES 247, 247 (1995). 
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estate, and real property attorneys. 105 Of the 371 respondents, 64 
percent reported "they had encountered [power of attorney] abuse in 
their own work."I06 Nearly a quarter (24%) encountered more than 
ten instances of power of attorney abuse. 107 
2. Reported Appellate Cases 
Case law often highlights glaring misuse of powers of attorney. 
One commentator summarized several appellate decisions dealing 
with types of power of attorney abuse. 108 In In re Estate of Cumbee, a 
son, who held power of attorney for his mother, "transferred the 
money out of his mother's joint accounts into accounts held solely in 
his own name.,,109 Later, a court held the son exerted undue influence 
in his mother's execution of a will naming him sole beneficiary of her 
estate, attempting to revoke prior wills distributing her estate equally 
among all her children. 110 In In re Estate ofF errara, it was a nephew 
who, with power of attorney, transferred about $820,000 of his 
uncle's assets to himself under the guise of an unlimited gift-giving 
provision added to the power of attorney.lll The nephew was held to 
have violated the "best interest requirement" of the fiduciary duty he 
owed his uncle under the power of attorney.ll2 Even one's own sister 
can misuse her power of attorney. In Levy v. Thompson, a sister used 
a power of attorney to liquidate her sister's certificates of deposit and 
purchase "annuities naming herself [and her heirs] as beneficiary 'per 
stirpes. ",113 The sister's actions in creating the annuity were held to 
be improper. 114 These cases suggest that the law is reactionary by 
only punishing the abuser after the harm occurs, rather than 
preventing it from happening. I 15 
105. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 7; Linda S. Whitton, National Durable Power of 
Attorney Survey Results and Analysis, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 4, 12 (Oct. 29, 2002), 
http://www.unifonnlaws.org/sharedidocs/power%20of.1020attomey/dpasurveyreport_ 
I 02902.pdf [hereinafter Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey]. 
106. Steigel & Klem, supra note 14, at 7; Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney 
Survey, supra note \OS, at 4, 12. 
107. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note \OS, at 4,12. 
108. Black, supra note 59, at 296-300. 
109. Id. at 296-97 (citing In re Estate of Cumbee, 511 S.E.2d 390,392-93 (S.c. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
110. Id. at 296-98. 
Ill. Id. at 298-99 (citing In re Estate of Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d 138, 139--41 (N.Y. 2006)). 
112. Jd. at 299. 
113. Id. at 300-01 (citing Levy v. Thompson, No. 20641, 2006 WL 2875429, at *1-2 
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2006)). 
114. Jd.at301. 
lIS. Id.at301-02. 
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The three cases discussed above appear in their respective reporters 
relatively recently: 1999, 2006, and 2006. 116 Below is a summary of 
research the author conducted on the number of power of attorney 
abuse cases appearing in appellate reporters since 1975.117 This 
research does not of course account for cases that were never 
appealed, but the findings do suggest an upward trend in power of 
attorney abuse cases being litigated. While the number of cases 
appealed is fairly small, the numbers are not insignificant given the 
many reasons power of attorney abuse cases may never be litigated at 
all. 118 
Year Number of Year Number of Year Number of Cases Cases Cases 
2012 11 2001 7 1990 2 
2011 5 2000 3 1989 1 
2010 5 1999 4 1988 2 
2009 12 1998 4 1987 1 
2008 12 1997 4 1986 2 
2007 7 1996 5 1985 2 
2006 6 1995 2 1984 2 
2005 5 1994 2 1981 1 
2004 2 1993 1 1978 1 
2003 1 1992 1 1976 1 
2002 3 1991 2 
116. Ferrara, 852 N.E.2d 138; Levy, 2006 WL 2875429; In re Estate of Cumbee, 511 
S.E.2d 390 (S.c. Ct. App. 1999). 
117. The following search of all state and federal cases was conducted using Lexis 
Advance®. The search terms used were: "power of attorney" nearllO abus! or misus! 
but not "abus! of discretion." 
118. See infra Part III.C. 
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Interestingly, the upward tick in cases since 1994 coincides with 
studies being conducted in the early 1990s "investigating the 
frequency and severity of [power of attorney] abuse . . . and elder 
abuse in general [becoming] a prominent concern later" in the 
1990s.119 
3. Media Reports - The Story of Virginia Freck 
Reports in the media are also instructive of the extent of power of 
attorney abuse. The case of 98-year-old Virginia Freck is one. At a 
young age, Freck learned to be frugal. She had an allowance of one 
quarter a week. If she spent "the entire quarter that same week, she 
would owe [her parents] 50 cents the next week.,,120 
Freck would "build a nice nest egg" over her life. 121 She graduated 
from Duke University and moved to New York City. There, she 
became a success and a bit of a New York socialite. Freck was a 
member of the Rockettes, modeled for Macy's department store, 
worked for CBS, and volunteered for both the usa and Coast Guard. 
She was known to socialize with CBS and RCA executives. 122 
119. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 12-13 (discussing the studies of power of attorney misuse 
and emerging concerns regarding elder abuse occurring in the 1990s). 
120. The story of Virginia Freck was reported in the Montgomery Advertiser on June 4, 
2012. See Scott Johnson, Betrayal o/Trust: Elderly Woman's Life Savings 0/ Millions 
Drained, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (June 4, 2012), 
http://archive.montgomeryadvertiser.comlarticle/99999999INEWSO 1 II 06150006IBetr 
ayal-trust-Elderly-woman-s-life-savings-millions-drained. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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Freck married late in life, but never had any children. After her 
husband passed away, she lived alone in Florida. 123 Apparently, 
Freck needed some assistance and at some point started showing 
signs of dementia. Her husband's great-nephew, Joe, offered to 
assist, and Freck moved to Alabama where Joe had family.124 
In 2006, Joe had Freck sign a power of attorney form appointing 
him as her agent. The power of attorney was not prepared with the 
assistance of an attorney, but rather was drafted by Joe's girlfriend. 
Joe proceeded to exploit Freck at the rate of $53,000 per month. He 
spent Freck's money on casino gambling, alcohol, motorcycles, a 
house for himself, a convenience store, a bulldozer, and other 
property. The abuse did not come to light until one of Freck's bank 
accounts was overdrawn, and she was almost evicted from her 
apartment. In 2012, a judgment was entered against Joe in a civil 
lawsuit, and he was convicted of criminal elder financial exploitation. 
All told, Joe exploited Freck for more than $2.5 million dollars. 125 
C. Remedies for Power of Attorney Abuse 
As the Freck case illustrates, power of attorney abuse is often 
difficult to detect, and justice may come too late for the victim. The 
abuse may not even be detected until after the principal has died, and 
the principal's heirslbeneficiaries discover it. 126 Lawmakers have 
enacted various protections and remedies for power of attorney 
abuse. Professor Marie Failinger categorized the types of laws 
intended to protect against power of attorney abuse using Professor 
Samuel Bray's "harm rules" and "power rules.,,127 Harm rules are 
designed to "penalize the powerful person"-the agent under a power 
of attorney.128 Power rules are designed to limit the powerful 
person's-the agent's-"ability to accumulate power over the 
vulnerable principal in the first place.,,129 Professor Failinger 
concludes that harm rules have largely failed to curb power of 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. !d. 
126. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6. 
127. Failinger, supra note 20, at 138 (citing Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1172, 1173 (2010)). 
128. Id. at 138-39 (giving as examples: "raising the level of fiduciary responsibility 
undertaken by [agents], expecting economically competent ... investment and 
disposal of assets," and imposing damages for violation of fiduciary duties). 
129. Id. at 138. 
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attorney abuse. 13o States have turned to three types of power rules in 
power of attorney refonns. 131 "First, states have attempted to create 
more robust [document] execution requirements" to provide some 
"assurance that the principal is competent.,,132 Secondly, states have 
endeavored to reduce an agent's authority to conduct certain types of 
transactions. 133 Lastly, states have created "policing mechanisms 
during the life of the power of attorney." 134 
1. Civil Remedies 
A person subject to financial exploitation has civil remedies under 
tort law for causes of action "such as conversion, fraud, and breach of 
fiduciary duty.,,135 In the Unifonn Law Commission's 2002 survey, 
attorneys were asked about statutory relief: "Should [power of 
attorney] statute [ s] provide remedies and sanctions for agent abuse in 
addition to those available under common or criminal law?,,136 
Perhaps indicative of perceived inadequacies of common law and 
criminal remedies for power of attorney abuse, 75 percent of 
attorneys responded affinnatively.137 Thus, the Unifonn Power of 
Attorney Act (UPOAA) includes model statutory remedies for breach 
of duty to a principal. 138 Under the UPOAA, an agent owes certain 
130. Jd. at 140. 
131. Jd. 
132. Jd. (giving as examples: requiring "notarization of the document, increasing the 
number of witness to the [execution], and setting qualifications for witnesses"); see 
also Kohn, supra note 15, at 34 (stating that one current approach to reform is 
changing the execution requirements for a power of attorney). 
133. Failinger, supra note 20, at 140 (giving as an example: limiting the agent's ability to 
conduct transactions that benefit the agent); see also Kohn, supra note 15, at 34 
(stating that a second current approach to reform is "clarifying the limits of an 
[agent's] authority or imposing new limits on the [agent's] authority to act"). 
134. Failinger, supra note 20, at 140 (giving as examples: requiring the agent "to record the 
power of attorney when the principal becomes incapacitated," requiring the agent 
"account to the court," requiring the agent to "file inventories," allowing "interested 
parties to petition for an accounting or other relief from the [agent]," and permitting 
"relatives of the principal to require the [agent] to post a bond to protect the principal 
against potential financial [exploitation],,); see also Kohn, supra note 15, at 35 
(stating that a third current approach to reform is increasing "the ability of third 
parties to police" powers of attorney). 
135. Julie A. Lemke & Seymour Moskowitz, Protecting the Gold in the Golden Years: 
Practical Guidance for Professionals on Financial Exploitation, 7 MARQ. ELDER'S 
ADVISOR 1, II (2005). 
136. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 13. 
137. Jd. 
13S. See UNIF. POWER OF Arr'y ACT prefatory note, SA U.L.A. 374. 
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mandatory and default duties to the principal. 139 An agent found 
liable for breach of duty is required to "restore the value of the 
principal's property to what it would have been had the violation not 
occurred" and must pay the principal "for the attorney's fees and 
costs paid on the agent's behalf.,,140 The remedies provided under the 
UPOAA are not exclusive. 141 
Despite the availability of civil remedies, the civil justice system 
will rarely hold agents fully accountable for abusing their authority 
under powers of attorney. There are several practical and 
circumstantial reasons for this. A victim of power of attorney abuse 
may lack the capacity to pursue civil litigation. 142 He or she may not 
have the financial resources to fund the often-costly litigation, 
perhaps because the agent has spent or dissipated the principal's 
assets. 143 To encourage attorneys to represent victims of financial 
exploitation, "[ s lome states provide for additional or enhanced 
remedies, such as statutory attorney's fees and treble damages."I44 If 
litigation is ultimately pursued, some cases result in only partial 
recovery when the victims seek restitution. 145 Finally, a "lack of 
statutory clarity about an agent's duties" may create challenges to the 
success of litigation. 146 
2. Criminal Remedies 
Neither may criminal penalties be sufficient to fully curb power of 
attorney abuse. Some states distinctly criminalize power of attorney 
misuse. 147 However, the offense is often punished under another 
criminal law (theft or embezzlement, for example) without any 
sentencing enhancement. 148 Without a sentencing enhancement for 
crimes committed against the elderly victim, "a state's criminal law 
code offers little, if any, added deterrence" against these types of 
crimes. 149 Power of attorney abuse, whether distinctly criminalized 
139. Id. § 114, 8B V.L.A. 203. 
140. Id.§117. 
141. Id. § 123. 
142. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6. 
143. Id. 
144. Lemke & Moskowitz, supra note 135, at II. 
145. Hughes, supra note 69, at 294. 
146. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6. 
147. See Black, supra note 59, at 303 ("About ten states address financial exploitation of 
the elderly through statutes that specifically address misuse of power of attorney."). 
148. See id. (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1815 (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 507 
(West 2007». 
149. Id. at 308. 
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or not, may not be considered or understood to be a crime by 
investigators. 15o Law enforcement officers may not know that power 
of attorney abuse can be a crime, may not investigate the accusations, 
and may ultimately advise the complainant or those concerned that 
"it's a civil problem.,,151 
"Prosecutors may not receive case referrals from adult protective 
services ... banks, or law enforcement agencies.,,152 A 2006 New 
York study showed only a small fraction of power of attorney 
exploitation cases were referred to prosecutors. 153 And, of the 
referred cases, only one-seventh were actually prosecuted. 154 
Several factors contribute to low rates of prosecution. Prosecutors 
may lack expertise about power of attorney abuse or the resources to 
prosecute these cases, which can be demanding and labor intensive. 155 
A prosecutor may not move forward with a case in which the 
principal granted broad authority to the agent, including the authority 
to make gifts with the principal's property.156 Such an extensive 
grant of authority could create a reasonable doubt that the agent acted 
beyond his or her authority.157 
Prosecution may also be hindered due to the victim's 
circumstances. Principals are often unwilling to prosecute immediate 
family members or close friends who are commonly appointed as 
agents. 158 An elderly victim may be an unreliable witness because of 
mental capacity impaired by old age, leading courts to be skeptical of 
a demented person's allegations reasoning that "paranoid suspicions 
are a common incident of dementia.,,159 An elderly victim suffering 
from mental deficiencies may not recall that abuse has occurred, and 
thus, will not be able to testify in court. 160 Finally, the principal may 
150. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. (footnote omitted). 
153. Thomas Hilliard, Power Failures: Power of Attorney Authority and the Exploitation 
of Elderly New Yorkers, SCHUYLER CTR. FOR ANALYSIS & ADVOCACY 2-3 (2006), 
available at http://www.scaany.org/resources/documents/powerJailures.pdf (finding 
that power of attorney exploitation cases were referred to New York state prosecutors 
at an annual rate of9.5 referrals per 100,000 seniors). 
154. Id. at 3. 
155. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6. 
156. Black, supra note 59, at 307 (explaining by way of example how the broad authority 
granted to an agent might weaken the victim's case and dissuade the district attorney 
from moving forward with the prosecution). 
157. See id. 
158. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 6. 
159. See Black, supra note 59, at 307 (quoting Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946, 949 (7th 
Cir. 1996». 
160. Id. 
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have signed the power of attorney document on his own volition and 
"in accordance with the jurisdiction's proper procedures.,,161 That 
fact likely strengthens a defendant's case even if the principal was 
"unaware of what he or she was signing," or completely trusted the 
agent they were appointing only to be victimized later. 162 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY 
LAWS 
"Despite the significant potential for abuse by an agent," and the 
inadequacy of remedies for the principal, "protections for principals 
have been largely absent from [power of attorney] laws.,,163 Starting 
in 1964, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL), promulgated four model or uniform power of 
attorney acts: the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small 
Property Interests Act (1964), the Uniform Probate Code (1969), the 
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (UDPOAA) (1979), and the 
Uniform Power of Attorney Act (2006).164 The safeguards for 
principals have evolved from judicial supervision and restrictive 
provisions contained in the 1964 Act,165 to making powers of attorney 
less cumbersome and more available as low-cost alternatives to 
guardianship/conservatorship in the 1969 and 1979 Acts,166 and 
recently, to new provisions protecting against financial exploitation 
and preserving a principal's autonomy in the 2006 Act. 167 
A. Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests 
Act (1964) 
In 1964, the NCCUSL enacted a limited Model Special Power of 
Attorney for Small Property Interests Act (Model Act).168 The Model 
Act was promulgated in response to American Bar Foundation and 
other studies of the needs of elderly and incapacitated persons. 169 It 
was intended to help people with limited financial resources avoid 
161. Id. at 307-08. 
162. Id. 
163. Stiegei & Klem, supra note 14, at 8. 
164. Id. at 8-9. 
165. Id. at 9-10. 
166. See id. at 9. 
167. See id. at 11-12. 
168. Id. at 8-9. 
169. Boxx, supra note 16, at 6-7; see also Kohn, supra note 15, at 7 (stating thilt elderly 
principals are "[ c ]onsistent with the original purpose of the 1964 Model Act"). 
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expensive guardianship or conservatorship proceedings. 170 The stated 
purpose of the Model Act was to: 
provide a simple and inexpensive legal procedure for the 
assistance of persons with relatively small property interests, 
whose incomes are small, such as pensions or social security 
payments, and who, in anticipation or because of physical 
handicap or infirmity resulting from injury, old age, senility, 
blindness, disease or other related or similar causes, wish to 
make provision for the care of their personal or property 
rights or interests, or both when unable adequately to take 
care of their own affairs. It is not contemplated that a power 
of attorney executed under this Act will be used for the 
general handling of sizable commercial property interests. 
Neither is it intended wholly to replace conservatorship or 
guardianship, but rather it is designed as a less expensive 
alternative. 171 
The Model Act sought to limit the possibility for abuse that can 
result when principals surrender their legal power to agents.172 Due 
to the commissioners' apparent concerns about durable powers of 
attorney, the Model Act contained a number of restrictive 
provisions. 173 It ensured some "day lighting" of the transfer of 
authority from principal to agent. 174 
The Model Act required that a durable power of attorney, which 
must include yearly income and a description of any property subject 
to the power, be "signed before a judge who approved the 
document.,,175 The document had to be filed with the court clerk and 
recorded in real property records. 176 The Model Act also included a 
blank space for the maximum dollar value of property that could be 
170. Seal, supra note II, at 310. 
171. Boxx, supra note 16, at 7 (quoting NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY-THIRD YEAR 274 
(1964)). 
172. Failinger, supra note 20, at 133 (citing NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY-
THIRD YEAR 275-81 (1964)). 
173. Seal, supra note II, at 310. 
174. Failinger, supra note 20, at 133. 
175. Boxx, supra note 16, at 7-8 (noting the drafters' hope that the judge would know the 
principal and be able to detennine if there were any concerns about the power of 
attorney). 
176. Jd. 
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subject to a durable power of attorney, allowing enacting states to set 
that value.177 The power of attorney would cease when the income 
and/or assets subject to the power exceeded that relatively small 
dollar amount. 178 The drafters of the Model Act warned that if the 
restrictions on estate size were removed, then "extensive safeguards 
and more detailed and complicated procedures" would be required to 
protect principals. 179 Finally, the Model Act required agents "to 
account to the principal or the principal's legal representative" if 
required by the document itself or a judge. 180 
B. Uniform Probate Code (1969) 
The NCCUSL next addressed powers of attorney and the issue of 
durability in creating the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) of 1969. 181 
The UPC did not contain any of the protections of the Model Act. 182 
Instead, the focus turned to making powers of attorney less 
cumbersome. 183 By removing the provisions limiting the use of 
powers of attorney to small estates, the UPC made it possible for 
anyone to execute a power of attorney.l84 The drafters of the UPC 
were prepared to make the durable power of attorney "available for a 
broad constituency as an economic alternative to guardianship.,,185 
This prompted an enduring legislative tendency to make the power of 
attorney more accessible and easier to use. 186 The policy choices 
seem to have had their intended effect. After the UPC was enacted, 
the durable power of attorney gained popularity.ls7 
The UPC authorized durable powers of attorney and, for the first 
time, springing powers of attorney in section 5-501: 
Whenever a principal designates another his attorney in fact 
or agent by a power of attorney in writing and the writing 
contains the words "This power of attorney shall not be 
affected by disability of the principal," or "This power of 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 9. 
180. Id. at 8-9. 
181. Seal, supra note II, at 311. 
182. Id.; see also Boxx, supra note 16, at 10. 
183. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 11-12, 44-45 (noting the modifications made to the 
Uniform Probate Code). 
184. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 9. 
185. Boxx, supra note 16, at II. 
186. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 14. 
187. Dessin, supra note 37, at 579. 
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attorney shall become effective upon the disability of the 
principal," or similar words showing the intent of the 
principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable 
notwithstanding his disability, the authority of the attorney 
in fact or agent is exercisable by him as provided in the 
power on behalf of the principal notwithstanding later 
disability or incapacity of the principal at law or later 
uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or alive. 188 
The second quoted expression above ("This power of attorney shall 
become effective upon the disability of the principal") represents the 
first time a state law or uniform act permitted springing powers of 
attorney, in this case, upon the "disability" of the principal. 189 
Neither the Virginia statute in 1954 nor the Model Act in 1964 
contained language allowing springing powers of attorney.190 The 
Virginia law provided for durability as follows: "This power of 
attorney (or his authority) shall not terminate on disability of the 
principal."191 The Model Act provided for durability as follows: "The 
power is not invalidated by reason of any subsequent change in the 
mental or physical condition of the principal, including but not 
restricted to incompetency.,,192 Thus, the concept of a springing 
durable power of attorney originated with the UPC. 
C. Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (1979) 
The NCCUSL enacted the UDPOAA in 1979. 193 The UDPOAA 
was conceived as a free-standing act that a state could adopt 
separately from the UPC and was created to make powers of attorney 
more useful. 194 The drafters of the UDPOAA affirmed the legislative 
intent of altering the common law rule and allowing powers of 
attorney to continue to be effective in the event of a principal's later 
incompetency or disability.195 The stated purpose of durability was to 
allow for the management of an incapacitated person's affairs by 
188. VNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501 (1969). 
189. See generally Dessin, supra note 37, at 576-580,577 n.11 (discussing the types, 
history, and fonnation of durable powers ofattomey, and, particularly, the presence of 
a springing power as created by the VPC). 
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (repealed 2010); MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF Arr'y FOR 
SMALL PROP. INTERESTS ACT (1964). 
191. § 11-9.1. 
192. MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF Arr'y FOR SMALL PROP. INTERESTS ACT § I (a) (1964). 
193. VNIF. DURABLE POWER OF Arr'y ACT historical notes (superseded 2006), 8A V.L.A. 
373. 
194. Id. at prefatory note, 8A V.L.A. 374. 
195. Id. 
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non-court regimes. 196 The drafters also viewed durable powers of 
attorney as providing a simple way for people of more modest means 
to manage their property in the same way wealthier people might use 
trusts or other tools. 197 The UDPOAA contains the following: 
only five short sections that define the creation and effect of 
a durable power of attorney, the relationship of an attorney-
in-fact to a later court-appointed fiduciary, the binding 
effect of agent action taken without actual knowledge of the 
principal's death, and the sufficiency of an agent's affidavit 
as proof of the power's validity.198 
By 1984, all 50 states had enacted statutes allowing a principal to 
create a durable power of attorney. 199 
In relation to springing powers of attorney, the UDPOAA uses the 
same authorizing language as the UPC except for the addition of the 
term "incapacity" to "disability of the principal" as the triggering 
event.2OO The springing provision in the UDPOAA reads: "This 
power of attorney shall become effective upon the disability or 
incapacity of the principal.,,201 The drafters of the UDPOAA also 
saw the need to address two concerns about springing powers.202 
One, there seemed to be some uncertainty, following the UPC, about 
the validity of springing powers of attorney in general.203 The 
drafters settled any doubt by emphasizing that durable powers of 
attorney with postponed effectiveness were permitted.204 Two, the 
drafters acknowledged some concerns that critics of the UPC had 
raised-the difficulty of ascertaining the disability or incapacity of a 
principal without a court order.20s The drafters responded by stating 
that "draftsmen of durable powers are not limited in their choice of 
words to describe the later time when the principal wishes the 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Linda S. Whitton, Crossing State Lines with Durable Powers, 17 PROB. & PROP. 28, 
28 (2003). 
199. Fedennan & Reed, supra note 40, at 15 (citing Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an 
Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985,1012-13 (1984». 
200. VNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATT'y ACT § I, 8A V.L.A. 386. 
201. Id. (emphasis added). 
202. Id. at prefatory note, 8A V.L.A. 374. 
203. Id. at prefatory note, 8A V.L.A. 374-375. 
204. Id. § 1 cmt., 8A V.L.A. 386. 
205. Id. 
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authority of the agent in fact to become operative. ,,206 They concluded 
by suggesting specific ways a springing power of attorney could be 
designed to ascertain a principal's future incapacity.207 
D. Uniform Power of Attorney Act (2006) 
The Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA) of 2006 continues 
the trend of reforms in the direction of utility by promoting the 
usefulness of durable powers of attorney as a "low-cost, flexible, and 
private form of surrogate decision-making.,,208 The UPOAA also 
provides new benefits such as mandatory safeguards that protect 
principals, agents, and third parties; clearer guidelines for agents; 
and, an optional statutory power of attorney form.209 By 2015, the 
UPOAA had been adopted by 17 jurisdictions: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.2lO 
The UPOAA includes numerous new provisions and makes 
important changes to the UDPOAA. First, durability is the default 
rule for powers of attorney involving finances. 2lI Second, the 
UPOAA requires a power of attorney to be signed by the principal, 
and if that signature is acknowledged before a notary public, the 
principal's signature is presumed to be genuine.212 Third, the 
UPOAA defines the default and mandatory fiduciary duties an agent 
owes to his or her principal.213 Fourth, the UPOAA requires an agent 
be granted express authority in the power of attorney in order to 
conduct certain types of transactions known as "hot powers. ,,214 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Why States Should Adopt UPOAA, supra note 13. 
209. Id. 
210. Legislative Fact Sheet - Power of Attorney, supra note 2. 
211. See VN1F. POWER OF ATT'y ACT §§ 103, 104, 8B V.L.A. 187-89. 
212. Id. § 105, 8B V.L.A. 190. Vnder the VPOAA, a power of attorney can alternatively 
be signed by "another individual directed by the principal to sign the principal's name 
on the power of attorney." Id. 
213. Id. § 114, 8B V.L.A. 203-04. 
214. Id. § 201, 8B V.L.A. 225. The powers requiring a specific grant of authority are: 
(I) create, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust; (2) 
make a gift; (3) create or change rights of survivorship; (4) create 
or change a beneficiary designation; (5) delegate authority granted 
under the power of attorney; (6) waive the principal's right to be a 
beneficiary of a joint and survivor annuity, including a survivor 
benefit under a retirement plan; [or] (7) exercise fiduciary powers 
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Lastly, the UPOAA provides for judicial review of agent conduct and 
imposes liability for agent misconduct.215 
I. Springing Power of Attorney Provisions 
Section 109 of the UPOAA provides the default rules for when a 
power of attorney is effective and how a principal's incapacity is to 
be determined if a springing power of attorney is used.216 As a 
default, the authority of an agent under a power of attorney becomes 
effective when the document is signed by the principal. 217 A power 
of attorney is effective immediately when it is executed, unless the 
principal states in the power of attorney that it becomes effective in 
the future.218 If a principal elects a springing power of attorney, the 
principal may authorize one or more persons to provide written 
verification that the future event or contingency, the principal's 
incapacity, has occurred.219 To facilitate the authorized person's 
access to the principal's health information, likely needed to verify 
the principal's incapacity, the UPOAA provides that the authorized 
person may act as the principal's personal representative pursuant to 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIP AA).220 
Designating in advance who is authorized to determine the 
principal's incapacity helps protect the "principal's privacy and 
facilitates acceptance of springing powers by third persons.,,221 
The UPOAA also provides the default method for determining and 
verifying a principal's incapacity if the principal has not designated 
any person to make the determination or such person is unable or 
unwilling to make the determination.222 In such a case, a physician or 
licensed psychologist can determine that the principal IS 
that the principal has authority to delegate[; or (8) disclaim 
property, including a power of appointment]. 
ld. (alterations in original). 
215. ld. §§ 116-17, 8B U.L.A. 209, 211. 
216. ld. § 109(a)-(b), 8B U.L.A. 196-97. 
217. ld. § 109(a), 8B U.L.A. 196. 
218. Id. ("A power of attorney is effective when executed unless the principal provides in 
the power of attorney that it becomes effective at a future date or upon the occurrence 
of a future event or contingency."). 
219. ld. § 109(b), 8B U.L.A. 197. 
220. ld. § 109(d), 8B U.L.A. 197; see also § 109 cm!., 8B U.L.A. 197 (explaining that a 
power of attorney also acts as a personal representative of the individual). 
221. Linda S. Whitton, Navigating the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 3 NAELA J. I, 15-
16 (2007) [hereinafter Whitton, Navigating]. 
222. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109(c), 8B D.L.A. 197. 
434 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
incapacitated.223 Incapacity is defined in the UPOAA as the 
"inability of an individual to manage property or business affairs 
because the individual [] has an impairment in the ability to receive 
and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions even 
with the use of technological assistance .... ,,224 
2. Provisions Intended to Protect Against Financial Exploitation 
Partly as a result of horror stories about agents who exploited their 
principals using powers of attorney, the NCCUSL studied power of 
attorney abuse prior to working on the UPOAA.22S The NCCUSL 
surveyed attorneys about power of attorney abuse, and 81 percent 
responded that power of attorney statutes should include safeguards 
against abuse by agents. 226 This potential for power of attorney abuse 
has caused much concern for states considering adopting the 
UPOAA.227 They are as concerned about the potential for financial 
abuse as they are about promoting principal autonomy.228 To address 
these concerns, the UPOAA contains a number of provisions 
intended to protect against financial exploitation.229 
One set of provisions in the UPOAA addresses transactions that 
exceed the intended scope of authority granted to an agent.230 The 
requirement that hot powers be expressly granted, rather than 
implied, eliminates any argument that a general grant of authority 
was intended to authorize these potentially dangerous transactions.231 
Furthermore, the standardized definitions of the types of authority 
granted in a power of attorney provide a "common field of 
understanding from which to interpret a power of attorney.,,232 This 
statutory clarity helps "reduce[] the risk that agents will 
unintentionally exceed [their scope of] authority but also provide[] 
[justification] to third persons who wish to reject the power of 
attorney because it does not authorize the desired transaction.,,233 An 
agent who succeeds in exceeding their scope of authority is subject to 
the mandatory duties prescribed in the UPOAA and may be found 
223. Id. § 109(c)(I), 8B V.L.A. 197 (alteration in original). 
224. Id. § 102(5)(a), 8B V.L.A. 184-85. 
225. Failinger, supra note 20, at 138. 
226. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 13. 
227. Id. 
228. Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 84, at 355. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 355-56. 
231. Id. at 356. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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civilly liable and, by extension, criminally prosecuted.234 Finally, the 
UPOAA provides improved means for detecting power of attorney 
abuse.235 
A second set of provisions in the UPOAA addresses transactions an 
agent conducts for a self-dealing purpose.236 A transaction may 
"actually [be] within the agent's scope of authority, but which is 
conducted for the agent's benefit without the principal's permission 
to self-deal."237 The UPOAA includes several default duties that bar 
an agent from engaging in self-dealing transactions unless modified 
by the power of attorney.238 The UPOAA contains additional 
proscriptions against self-dealing by non-family-member agents.239 
One means of stopping this difficult to prevent abuse is found in 
UPOAA provisions allowing a third party to refuse a power of 
attorney if they have a good-faith belief that a principal may be 
subject to abuse.24o A related requirement that such suspected abuse 
be reported to Adult Protective Services may prevent an attempt by 
the agent to conduct the abusive transaction at another location.241 
A final set of provisions in the UPOAA addresses "transactions 
conducted in contravention of the principal's expectations.,,242 This 
type of transaction is perhaps the most difficult to redress because the 
transaction may have been within the scope of authority granted in 
the power of attorney and may not constitute self-dealing.243 Three 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 357. The improved means of detection are as follows: 
Id. 
(1) adult protective services, or equivalent government agency, 
has standing to request an agent accounting; (2) any person who 
demonstrates sufficient interest in a principal's welfare may 
petition a court to construe a power of attorney or review an 
agent's conduct; and (3) a person may refuse an otherwise valid 
power of attorney if the person in good faith believes that the 
principal may be subject to ... abuse ... and a report is made to 
adult protective services. 
236. Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 84, at 345. 
237. Id. at 357. 
238. Id. at 358. 
239. Id. (citing UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 20 I (b), 8B u.L.A. 226). 
240. /d. at 353-54 (citing UNIF. POWER OF An'y ACT § 120(b)). 
241. Id. at 358. 
242. Id. at 345. 
243. Id. at 359. Professor Whitton recounts the story of Ronald Slomski as an example. 
Slomski's mother, using the power of attorney he granted her, changed the 
beneficiaries on his pension plan from his step-daughters to his siblings. The power 
of attorney authorized the agent to exercise all powers with respect to retirement 
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provlSlons of the UPOAA help protect against this type of abuse. 
First, as an example, a hot power like changing beneficiary 
designations must be expressly granted and cannot be "implied from 
a general grant of authority to deal with 'insurance and annuities.',,244 
Second, the UPOAA requires agents, to the best of their knowledge, 
to perform as the principal reasonably expects.245 Third, an agent 
must aim "to preserve the principal's estate plan, to the extent 
actually known by the agent, if preserving the plan is consistent with 
the principal's best interest. ,,246 
3. Provisions Intended to Preserve the Principal's Autonomy 
The UPOAA preserves principal autonomy by providing choices 
for principals and encouraging implementation of those choices by 
agents and third parties.247 A successful power of attorney "depends 
on how effectively the scope of authority is delineated, how faithfully 
the agent acts to manifest the principal's expectations, and how 
willing third persons and would-be surrogates are to honor the 
principal's choice of agent.,,248 To that end, the UPOAA contains a 
number of provisions intended to facilitate a principal's autonomous 
choice and a surrogate's implementation of a principal's choices and 
goals.249 These provisions give a principal the flexibility to determine 
how to delegate authority, provide "clear guidelines for agent 
conduct," and protect a "principal's surrogate decision making 
plan.,,25o 
The UPOAA contains detailed statutory descriptions of the typical 
areas of authority that a principal can delegate to an agent. 25 I A 
principal may enlarge or limit the defined areas of authority in either 
the statutory form or an individually drafted power of attorney by 
plans. Slomski's step-daughters were also the beneficiaries under his will. According 
to the news account, by the time Slomski died, '''[e]verything he had saved had been 
moved beyond the reach of the heirs designated in his will. ", Id. (quoting Dennis B. 
Roddy, Courting Trouble: The Document Granting 'Power of Attorney' Often Leads 
to Abuse, PIITSBURGH POST-GAZEITE (Sept. 2, 2007), http://www.post-
gazette.comlnews/nationl2007 109/02/Courting -Trouble-The-document -granting-
power-of-attomey-often-Ieads-to-abuse/stories/200709020 148). 
244. Id. at 360. 
245. Id. (quoting VNIF. POWER OF AIT'y ACT § 114(a)(l), 8B V.L.A. 203). 
246. Id. (quoting VNIF. POWER OF AIT'y ACT § 114(b)(6), 8B V.L.A. 204). 
247. Id. at 346. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 345. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 346. 
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adding specific language to the document.252 Certain areas of 
authority require a principal's express grant of authority to an 
agent.253 These powers were selected because of their potential 
danger: "dissipating the principal's property and altering the 
principal's estate plan.,,254 Thus, their grant to an agent should be 
intentional and based on a principal's objectives.255 The hot powers 
(with the exception of gifting authority) are not statutorily defined, 
giving a principal the incentive to further define or limit these powers 
in the document. 256 
A principal's expectations regarding the conduct of his or her agent 
are given paramount importance in the UPOAA.257 One of the three 
mandatory duties an agent has is to "act in accordance with the 
principal's reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by 
the agent and, otherwise, in the principal's best interest.,,258 A 
"principal's reasonable expectations, if known, trump the 'best 
interest' [standard] for agent conduct.,,259 For example, principals 
who have expressed their wishes regarding long-tenn care housing or 
donative activities should have their wishes honored, without analysis 
by the agent of the principal's best interests.26o The UPOAA contains 
other default duties an agent owes to a principal unless modified in 
the power of attomey.261 A principal can expressly allow an agent to 
engage in self-dealing transactions, for example, where it would be 
prohibited by default. 262 Ultimately, the UPOAA encourages a 
principal to make his or her expectations regarding agent conduct 
known, protecting the self-detennination interests of the principa1.263 
The UPOAA seeks to protect a principal's surrogate decision-
making plan in two ways. First, the UPOAA revised a provision 
contained in the UDPOAA that gives a court-appointed fiduciary the 
power to revoke or amend a power of attomey?64 The UDPOAA 
provision provided an opportunity for "would-be surrogates" to 
252. Id. at 346--47. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 348. 
255. Id. at 349. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. VNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 114(a)(I), 8B V.L.A. 203. 
259. Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 84, at 350. 
260. Id. at 349-50. 
261. Id. at 350. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 350-51. 
264. Id. at 351-52. 
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undennine the authority of a principal's selected agent.265 The 
UPOAA provision attempts to deter this type of undermining of the 
agent's authori~66 by providing that a "power of attorney is not 
terminated and the agent's authority continues unless limited, 
suspended, or terminated by the COurt.,,267 Second, the UPOAA 
attempts to deter "arbitrary refusals of powers of attorney by third 
persons such as banks and brokerage houses.,,268 The UPOAA 
contains "broad protections for good-faith acceptance of a power of 
attorney and statutory safe harbors for good-faith refusals.,,269 By 
including these liability protections, the aim is to increase acceptance 
of powers of attorney by financial institutions and, by doing so, honor 
a principal's choice of agent. 
V. STATUTORY POWER OF ATTORNEY FORMS 
Opinions are mixed as to the wisdom of states authorizing statutory 
power of attorney forms. When surveyed in advance of the UPOAA, 
59 percent of attorneys were in favor of "statutory short forms" while 
41 percent disfavored them.270 State-approved forms provide some 
potential benefits. One, they reduce the costs associated with 
executing the document. 271 Two, they are more universally 
recognized by third parties such as banks,272 and as a result, may 
promote acceptance of powers of attorneys by third parties.273 On the 
other hand, the use of statutory power of attorney forms "may result 
in less individualized documents and encourage the execution of 
documents with little or no legal counseling.,,274 
A. Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act (1988) 
The Uniform Statutory Fonn Power of Attorney Act (Statutory 
Short Form) provided a "simple, non-detailed, short form" power of 
attorney that states could adopt and give legislative sanction to.275 
Like the UPC and UDPOAA preceding it, the purpose of the 
Statutory Short Form was to make durable powers of attorney more 
265. Id. at 351. 
266. Jd. at 346. 
267. Jd. at 352 (citing VNIF. POWER OF Arr'y ACT § 108(b), 8B V.L.A. 194). 
268. Jd. 
269. Id. at 353. 
270. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 6-7. 
271. Kohn, supra note 15, at 7. 
272. Id. 
273. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 11. 
274. Kohn, supra note 15, at 7. 
275. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 16. 
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practical and easy to execute.276 Statutory short fonn powers of 
attorney became increasingly popular with states in the mid- to late 
1980s and early 1990s.277 However, some commentators were 
concerned that statutory short fonns enhanced the potential for abuse 
by making powers of attorney "easier for individuals to create . . . 
without legal counsel.,,278 Indeed, Indiana rejected the statutory short 
fonn, because the state wanted to avoid any potential for abuse that 
could result in the execution of these documents in the absence of 
legal counse1.279 However, the trend was to the contrary, and by 
2006, 20 states and the District of Columbia provided standard, 
statutorily described power of attorney fonns for use by principals 
and attorneys alike.28o 
B. Uniform Power of Attorney Act (2006) - Statutory Forms 
Article 3 of the UPOAA provides two statutory fonns, both 
optional: a statutory power of attorney fonn and agent certification 
fonn. 281 The drafting committee, seeing the proliferation of power of 
attorney fonns available to the public, elected to include a "statutory 
fonn on the premise that the public would be better served by a fonn 
which minimizes traps for the unwary.,,282 The committee also 
looked at the experiences of some states where state-sanctioned 
power of attorney fonns had been used and concluded that, over time, 
"statutory fonn[ s] promote[] unifonnity in power of attorney practice 
and facilitate[] [third-party] acceptance of powers of attomey.,,283 
The UPOAA power of attorney fonn is designed so that it can be 
used by laypersons and lawyers alike.284 It uses "layperson-friendly 
language" while at the same time providing drafting flexibility for 
attorneys.285 
The statutory power of attorney fonn follows the default rule 
provided in Section 1 09( a) of the UPO AA that a power of attorney is 
276. [d. 
277. See id. at 19 (listing fifteen states that adopted statutory short form powers of attorney 
between 1983 and 1993). 
278. Id. at 20. 
279. [d. at 20-21 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
280. See Kohn, supra note 15, at 6-7 (citing the state code sections providing model power 
of attorney forms). 
281. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT §§ 301, 302, 8B V.L.A. 250-55, 260-61 (2014). 
282. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 11. 
283. [d. (naming Illinois and New York as examples); see also VNIF. POWER OF Arr'y ACT 
art. 3 cmt., 8B V.L.A. 250. 
284. Whitton, Navigating, supra note 221, at II. 
285. [d. 
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effective immediately.286 However, a principal or drafting attorney 
can modify the language to make the power of attorney springing.287 
Under "Important Information" directed to the principal, the form 
states: "This power of attorney becomes effective immediately unless 
you state otherwise in the Special Instructions.,,288 Later in the form, 
under "Effective Date", the same statement is essentially repeated: 
"This power of attorney is effective immediately unless I have stated 
otherwise in the Special Instructions.,,289 Finally, the principal or 
drafting attorney is given this direction under "Special Instructions 
(Optional): You may give special instructions on the following 
lines.,,290 
A drafting attorney may recognize this inconspicuous invitation to 
use the form's Special Instructions to draft against the default rule 
and include springing language with a clearly-defined means for 
determining the principal's future incapacity. However, a principal 
may not recognize the invitation or the various consequences. First, 
the principal may not know that a springing power of attorney, one 
that goes into effect upon his or her incapacity, is even an option. 
Second, the principal may not fully understand the meaning of this 
power of attorney is effective immediately. A layperson's 
interpretation of this phrase may simply be that the document, like 
any other legal document, is effective when it is signed. A principal 
may not interpret the phrase to mean what it precisely means; that, 
the principal's execution of the document grants his or her agent the 
immediate authority to act with the principal's finances and property. 
Third, if a principal recognizes the invitation to make the power of 
attorney springing, he or she is not given any direction or suggested 
language to effectively define the future effectiveness of the agent's 
authority. 
Section 302 of the UPOAA provides an optional agent's 
certification form.291 The form may be used by an agent to certify, 
under penalty of perjury, certain facts concerning a power of 
attorney.292 A person who is asked to accept a power of attorney may 
request and rely upon an agent's certification of any factual matter 
concerning the principal, agent, or power of attorney.293 One of the 
286. VNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109, emt., 88 V.L.A. 197. 
287. [d. § 109(a), 88 V.L.A. 196. 
288. [d. § 301, 88 V.L.A. 250-51. 
289. [d. § 301, 88 V.L.A. 253. 
290. [d. 
291. [d. § 302, 88 V.L.A. 260. 
292. [d. 
293. VNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 58-119,88 V.L.A. 310-11. 
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facts the fonn allows an agent to certify is "if the Power of Attorney 
was drafted to become effective upon the happening of an event or 
contingency, the event or contingency has occurred.,,294 
Consequently, for springing powers of attorney, third parties may 
request and rely upon an agent's certification that the event or 
contingency-the principal's incapacity-has occurred.295 
VI. IMMEDIATE VS. SPRINGING POWERS OF ATTORNEY 
Many people harbor differing opinions as to "whether a power of 
attorney should be immediately effective or 'springing. ",296 In 
advance of the UPOAA, attorneys were surveyed and asked "whether 
their clients prefer immediately effective or springing powers of 
attorney.,,297 Sixty-one percent of attorneys responded that their 
clients prefer immediately effective powers of attorney, 23 percent 
responded that their clients prefer springing powers of attorney, and 
16 percent saw no trend.298 Nine out often attorneys responded that a 
power of attorney statute should pennit springing powers of 
attorney.299 So, while nearly all attorneys think springing powers 
should be pennitted, most also report their clients prefer immediately 
effective powers.300 
Immediately effective powers of attorney offer several advantages. 
Many attorneys prefer this approach because they provide maximum 
flexibility to the agent acting in the interest of the principal. 301 A 
principal has the "convenience benefit of having a surrogate 
[decision-maker in place] who can act when it is logistically difficult 
294. UNIF. POWER OF A TT'y ACT § 302, 8B U.L.A. 260. 
295. California may have originated the concept of an agent's certification form. In 1989, 
the California Law Revision Commission recommended "a simple statutory validation 
of springing powers of attorney that would protect third persons who act in reliance on 
a written declaration that the power is effective." Recommendations Relating to 
Powers of Attorney, 20 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 405, 411 (1990), 
http://clrc.ca.gov/publPrinted-ReportslPub 163 .pdf [hereinafter Recommendations]. 
296. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 13. 
297. ld. (footnote omitted). 
298. ld. at 6; see also UNIF. POWER OF A TT'y ACT § 109 cmt, 8B U .L.A. 197-98. 
299. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 7. 
300. Jd. at 6--7. While a survey of attorneys about their clients' preferences is instructive, a 
direct survey of the general public about their assumptions and preferences regarding 
powers of attorney is needed. For a person who is contemplating executing a power 
of attorney, when do they assume their agent's authority will begin? For a person 
who is given a choice between immediate and springing effectiveness, what is their 
preference? 
301. Kohn, supra note 15, at 4-5. 
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for the principal to [act, perhaps because of a] temporary absence or 
[period of] incapacity.,,302 A principal can also "test drive" the power 
of attorney while they still have capacity to assess the agent's 
trustworthiness, skills, and judgment to determine if the agent can 
and will carry out the principal's wishes.,,303 When the power of 
attorney is effective immediately, it gives a principal the opportunity 
to discuss his expectations with the agent and to delegate some 
decision-making responsibilities to the agent while the principal has 
capacity.304 And, by executing "an immediately effective power of 
attorney," a principal "avoids the stigma of the triggering event"-his 
or her incapacity-and having to determine how that incapacity is to 
be verified.305 In contrast, springing powers of attorney "are seen as 
cumbersome for the agent" because of the need to provide "proof of 
the triggering event" to third parties before being allowed to act 
under the power of attorney. 306 
The primary justifications for a springing power of attorney are the 
principal's "self-determination and privacy interests.,,307 Many 
principals prefer springing powers of attorney in order to maintain 
privacy and hope that they will never need someone else to make 
decisions on their behalf. 308 When planning for the possibility of later 
incapacity, a principal may not want to give up current control of his 
or her financial affairs.309 
Some principals prefer springing powers of attorney for another 
reason-"the agent's access to the principal's ["treasure"] can be 
delayed until surrogate management is necessitated by [the 
principal's] incapacity, which may never occur.,,310 Professor 
Whitton questions "the common sense wisdom of this approach" 
because it comes at the cost of the more important long-term 
consideration of the principal discussing their expectations, personal 
values, preferences, and objectives with their agent. 3ll The 
suggestion is that a springing power of attorney, with its delayed 
effectiveness, may discourage or delay a principal from having a 
302. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 13. 
303. [d. 
304. [d. 
305. [d. at 13-14. 
306. Kohn, supra note 15, at 5. 
307. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey, supra note 105, at 14. 
308. UNIF. POWER OF Arr'y ACT § 109 emt., 8B U.L.A. 197-98. 
309. Whitton, Navigating, supra note 221, at 14. 
310. Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We 
Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 19-20 (2007) [hereinafter Whitton, Durable 
Powers]. 
311. [d. at 20. 
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conversation with their agent regarding the principal's 
expectations.312 However, the opposite may be true-an immediately 
effective power of attorney discourages that important discussion.313 
Some principals execute powers of attorney and don't inform their 
intended agents.314 Some execute an immediately effective power of 
attorney only to leave the document with their lawyer for safekeeping 
who is authorized to release it to the principal's agent upon the 
incapacity of the principal. 315 These "secret powers" are detrimental 
for two reasons. One, the agent may be unable or unwilling to serve 
when they are needed.316 Two, an agent who is willing to serve may 
not know the principal's expectations and thus the agent cannot fully 
effectuate the principal's objectives.317 
The reason a principal secretes his power of attorney away may be 
that he was hesitant to grant an immediately effective power of 
attorney in the first place.318 Why would a principal be wary of 
executing an immediately effective power of attorney? One, he may 
be afraid of losing his independence and allowing someone else to 
control his property and finances. Two, he may be concerned about 
being exploited by his agent. This hesitance causes the principal to 
keep the power of attorney away from his agent.319 A principal who 
is fearful of sharing the power of attorney document with his or her 
agent is not likely to have an open and frank discussion with the 
agent about the principal's expectations.320 
Rather than damper, springing powers of attorney may actually 
encourage a principal to discuss his wishes and expectations with his 
selected agent. Any wariness a principal has about losing control or 
being exploited is eased by the fact that the power of attorney goes 
into effect only if the principal is incapacitated.321 The principal may 
be more comfortable talking about future decision making, which 
may never be needed, rather than present decision making. The 
principal may also be able to link the conversation to other advance 
312. !d. 
313. Kohn, supra note 15,at5. 
314. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 20. 
315. Kohn, supra note 15, at 5 (pointing out the "host of ethical and practical problems" 
that this type of arrangement raises). 
316. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 20. 
317. !d. 
318. Recommendations, supra note 295, at 410. 
319. Id. ("[T]here is no reason to force people into selecting this arrangement rather than a 
relatively simple springing power of attorney."). 
320. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 20. 
321. See Failinger, supra note 20, at 15. 
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decision-making instruments.322 For example, the principal may have 
completed a living will at the same time he or she completed a 
springing power of attorney. With a living will, it is crucial that the 
principal discuss his wishes regarding end-of-life decisions with his 
proxy.323 The principal can start the conversation, perhaps about both 
documents, with his or her agents/proxies by simply stating, "Here's 
what I want to happen if . ... " 
A. Ascertaining a Principal's Incapacity 
Some commentators have pointed out that springing powers of 
attorney are problematic because of the difficulty in determining the 
triggering event-the principal's incapacity.324 Determining 
incapacity may be a challenge because people often experience a 
steady decline in mental capacity.325 Moreover, it may be hard to 
determine when a person crosses that threshold and becomes 
incapacitated.326 Adding to the problem, "a person's competency 
may vary depending on the day or time of day.,,327 A principal and 
his or her family could eventually end up in court needing a judicial 
determination of capacity, "defeat[ing] one of the advantages of the 
durable power of attorney.,,328 
While determining incapacity can be difficult, there are several 
ways the problem can be alleviated. First, lawyers can, and really 
should, draft precise language in a springing power of attorney 
"specifically delineat[ing] how the principal is to be declared 
incompetent. ,,329 It could be as simple as borrowing language already 
found in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA). As 
discussed previously, the UPOAA includes a statutory default that a 
physician can determine and provide written verification that a 
principal is incapacitated.330 Another approach, borrowed from 
322. See Susan Martyn & Lynn Balshone Jacobs, Legislating Advanced Directives for the 
Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 776, 
797 (1984) (discussing the benefit of executing a living will in conjunction with a 
durable power of attorney). 
323. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring a proxy to accept his 
appointment in writing); id. § 22-8A-4(h) (providing this statement in the statutory 
Advance Directive for Health Care form, next to where the principal initials his intent 
to appoint a proxy, "I have talked with this person about my wishes"). 
324. Christiansen, supra note 39, at 403. 
325. [d. 
326. [d. 
327. [d. 
328. [d. 
329. Id. 
330. UNIF.POWEROFATT'vAcT§ \09(c)(l),88U.L.A.197. 
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guardianship law, is to articulate more specific and clear statutory 
definitions of incapacity.331 The UPOAA seems to have 
accomplished this by including a statutory definition of incapacity.332 
This definition could be adopted uniformly by states and incorporated 
in springing power of attorney documents. 
Principals can also specify in a springing power of attorney how 
their incapacity is to be determined. The principal can name a person 
who is authorized to determine the principal's incapacity, and state 
how that determination is to be made and verified. The nominated 
person, if asked by a third party, can certify that the contingency in 
the power of attorney (the principal's incapacity) has occurred using 
the sworn affidavit provided in the UPOAA.333 
Certifying a person's incapacity, while difficult, is also not 
uncommon when viewed within the overall context of advance 
decision-making legal documents. Healthcare powers of attorney are 
one example. For healthcare powers of attorney, a principal's 
incapacity must be established before someone else is legally 
authorized to make medical decisions for the principa1.334 An agent's 
authority under a healthcare power of attorney is not effective unless 
the principal lacks capacity.335 The same concept and methodology 
holds true for springing powers of attorney. 
Finally, as a last resort, a court could determine if a principal has 
become incapacitated. While this eventuality would defeat the 
purpose of a durable power of attorney, durable powers were not 
intended to completely replace court involvement. Durable powers 
of attorney were conceived as alternatives to, not as substitutes for, 
guardianship or conservatorship proceedings.336 The drafters of the 
Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests Act of 
1964 were clear on this point. The durable power of attorney was not 
"intended wholly to replace conservatorship or guardianship, but 
rather it [was] designed as a less expensive alternative.,,337 And in 
1979, the drafters of the UDPOAA concurred: "When the [UPC] was 
331. Failinger, supra note 20, at 15 (noting that many principals are adopting springing 
powers of attorney). 
332. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 102(5), 8B D.L.A. 184-85. 
333. Id. § 109(b), 8B U.L.A. 197. 
334. See Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is it Time to Pull the Plug?, 18 ELDER L. J. 
289,316 (2011). 
335. Id. 
336. Seal, supra note 11, at 310. 
337. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 7 (quoting MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATT'y FOR SMALL 
PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (1964)). 
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originally drafted, the dominant idea was that durable powers would 
be used as alternatives to court-oriented, protective procedures.,,338 
B. Choosing a Trustworthy Agent 
When executing a power of attorney, selecting a trustworthy, 
honest, reliable agent is critical. 339 The UPOAA drafting committee 
considered this the primary reason for making immediate 
effectiveness the default rule. "The default rule reflects a 'best 
practices' philosophy that any agent who can be trusted to act for the 
principal under a springing power of attorney should be trustworthy 
enough to hold an immediate power.,,340 If a principal mistrusts a 
prospective agent enough to avoid granting them immediate 
authority, the principal should rethink their choice of agent rather 
than grant them springing authority.341 Practically, however, 
principals often find it difficult to identify a trustworthy agent.342 Nor 
can we guarantee that those who hold power over us "will be 
predictable or faithful.,,343 Even a stereotypically ideal agent under a 
power of attorney can be untrustworthy. In one case, a city council 
member, family accountant, financial advisor, agent under power of 
attorney, and trustee who was authorized by a judge to manage an 
incompetent person's business affairs was charged with stealing 
$248,000 from the person's accounts and truSt. 344 
C. Statutory Defaults and Forms Should Assume No Attorney/Client 
Relationship 
Both immediately effective and springing powers of attorney have 
advantages and disadvantages. Ideally, these advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed when a client retains the services of a 
lawyer to prepare the document.345 However, statutory defaults 
338. UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATT'y ACT prefatory note (superseded 2006), 8A U.L.A. 
374. 
339. Seal, supra note II, at 318-20 (discussing a case in which the Colorado Supreme 
Court reasoned that a rule placing the risk of an agent's abuse of a power of attorney 
on the principal rather than on an innocent third party '''increases the principal's 
incentive to exercise care in selecting honest and reliable agents''') (quoting Willey v. 
Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo. 1994)). 
340. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 197. 
341. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 20. 
342. Id. at 18. 
343. Failinger, supra note 20, at 10. 
344. Christiansen, supra note 39, at 389. See infra Part VII.B.3 for the story of "Gladys." 
345. See Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 19 ("Careful planning requires 
considering not only the scope of authority for original and successor agents, but also 
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should not be premised on the assumption that a lawyer/client 
relationship exists. Today, numerous do-it-yourself sources provide 
power of attorney documents to individuals as an alternative to 
consulting with an attorney.346 These do-it-yourself forms come with 
a heightened risk of power of attorney abuse.347 Below, this Article 
contrasts a typical abuse situation with one in which an attorney 
would be involved. Statutory defaults should be premised on the 
assumption that a lawyer is not being consulted to prepare the 
document, and the client is not receiving any advice concerning 
immediate or springing authority. 
1. The Typical Scenario = High Risk of Financial Exploitation 
The following hypothetical represents a typical power of attorney 
abuse situation. The principal and soon-to-be victim is 82 years 
old.348 The principal/victim is female. 349 We will call her Mrs. 
Smith, a widow. She has a high income.35o Mrs. Smith has been 
experiencing some diminished cognitive functioning over the past 
few years. 351 The agent and soon-to-be perpetrator of power of 
attorney abuse is an adult child or other family member.352 We will 
call the agent Jane, Mrs. Smith's 55-year-old daughter. 353 
whether that authority should become effective immediately or upon a later event such 
as the principal's incapacity."). 
346. Seal, supra note 11, at 313 & n.17 (illustrating the readily available sources for power 
of attorney forms on the internet). 
347. Dessin, supra note 37, at 584. 
348. Nearly three-quarters of people age 80 or older have a power of attorney. Kohn, 
supra note 15, at 7. Of victims 60 years of age and older, 42.8 percent were 80 years 
of age or older. Teaster et aI., supra note 41, at 6. 
349. It is likely that principals are disproportionately women because women have a longer 
life expectancy than men. Kohn, supra note 15, at 7-8. States reported that 65.7 
percent of elder abuse victims were female. Teaster et aI., supra note 41, at 6. 
350. A fairly consistent finding of studies investigating what factors tend to be associated 
with signing a power of attorney is that individuals with higher incomes are more 
likely to execute a power of attorney than individuals with low incomes. Kohn, supra 
note 15, at 8. 
351. Individuals experiencing cognitive decline are more likely to execute a power of 
attorney than those who are not experiencing cognitive decline. Id. 
352. The typical agent under a power of attorney is either the spouse or adult child of an 
elderly principal. Id. Even if the hypothetical Mrs. Smith's spouse was still living, 
there is evidence to suggest that she would select an adult child as her surrogate 
decision-maker instead of her spouse. Id. The most common relationship of elder 
abuse victims to alleged perpetrators is parent/child and other family members. 
Teaster et aI., supra note 41, at 6. 
353. When a senior selects an adult child as surrogate decision-maker, it is more likely to 
be a daughter than a son. Kohn, supra note 15, at 9. 
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Jane realizes that her mother, with her declining mental capacity, 
needs assistance taking care of her own finances. Jane searches the 
Internet, finds, and downloads a power of attorney form. She fills out 
the form, takes it to her mother, and tells her that she (Jane) needs to 
be able to help take care of her finances. Mrs. Smith signs the power 
of attorney, and it is notarized.354 The power of attorney is durable. 355 
It grants the agent broad decision-making authority over the 
principal's finances and property, including real property.356 Jane's 
authority to deal with her mother's finances and property is effective 
as soon as Mrs. Smith signed the power of attorney. 357 
Jane has never seemed able to hold down a job for any length of 
time. When she loses her most recent job, she decides to move in 
with her mother.358 Unfortunately, things only get worse for Jane. 
She can't find employment. She starts to drink heavily. She 
frequents the local casino and quickly goes into debt. She starts to 
use the power of attorney to withdraw money from her mother's 
checking account, and eventually closes her savings accounts and 
CDs and deposits the proceeds into Jane's own accounts. However, 
Jane continues to go deeper into debt. She executes a deed, using the 
power of attorney, conveying her mother's home to herself. Finally, 
feeling her mother would be safer living in a nursing home, Jane sells 
the home and forces Mrs. Smith to move into a nursing home.359 All 
totaled, Jane exploits her mother for $145,768.360 
354. Under the UPOAA, a notarized power of attorney creates a presumption, upon which 
third persons can rely, that the principal's signature is genuine. UNIF. POWER OF 
Arr'y ACT § 105, 8B U.L.A 187, 190. 
355. See UNIF. POWER OF Arr'y ACT § 104, 8B V.L.A 187, 189 (making durability the 
default position). 
356. Powers of attorney often grant agents broad decision-making authority over a 
principal's finances and property. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. Under the 
UPOAA, a general grant of authority authorizes the agent to deal with the principal's 
real property. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 204, 8B U.L.A 231-32. 
357. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109(a), 8B U.L.A. 196 (making immediate 
effectiveness the default position). 
358. Most elder abuse reports (89.3 percent) occurred in a domestic setting. Teaster et aI., 
supra note 4 I, at 6. 
359. "In most states, for example, an agent who felt her mother would be safer living in a 
nursing home could force an unwanted move by using the DPOA to sell the mother's 
house without so much as notifying her." Kohn, supra note 15, at I. 
360. In a study of 79 elder financial abuse cases, the average amount of money exploited 
by family, friends, neighbors, or caregivers was $145,768. MetLife Study, supra note 
64, at 8. 
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2. No Legal Counseling = Higher Risk of Exploitation 
As the above hypothetical illustrates, it is easy to prepare a power 
of attorney without the benefit of legal advice.361 Fonn documents 
are available on the Internet and from other do-it-yourself 
resources.362 No longer are power of attorney fonns found just at 
"stationery stores.,,363 "Many people make a [power of attorney] 
without fully understanding its inherent risks," enhancing the 
likelihood of exploitation.364 And not having a lawyer prepare a 
power of attorney heightens the risk of exploitation. Lawyers who 
draft powers of attorney for elderly clients help prevent financial 
abuse in several ways.365 First, lawyers have certain ethical duties 
which reduce the risk of exploitation.366 Second, a power of attorney 
document can be drafted with "built-in safeguards" to avert abuse.367 
Third, attorneys can counsel their clients on options the client might 
choose to reduce the risk of abuse.368 A statutory power of attorney 
fonn executed without the benefit of legal advice comes with none of 
these protections.369 
The 4 C's of Elder Law Ethics 
Attorneys who regularly deal with elderly clients follow what are 
referred to as the "Four C's" of elder law ethics.370 The "Four C's" 
are: client identification, conflicts of interests, confidentiality, and 
competency.371 Each of these C's represents an ethical duty owed by 
361. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
362. ld. 
363. English & Wolff, supra note 34, at 33 (writing, in 1996, "DPA forms are readily 
available and can be found at most stationery stores"). 
364. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
365. Ellen J. Henningsen, Preventing Financial Abuse by Agents Under Powers of 
Attorney, 73 WIS. LAW. 25,25-27 (2000). 
366. Lemke & Moskowitz, supra note 135, at 5,11. 
367. Black, supra note 59, at 308. 
368. Henningsen, supra note 365, at 26, 28. 
369. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 5. 
370. ABA Comm'n on Law and Aging, Understanding the Four C's of Elder Law Ethics, 
ABA (2011), available at http://www.americanbaLorg/contentldamJaba/ 
uncategorizedl20 11120 11_ aging_ 4c _ broch jul_ 25 _20 l1.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter Understanding the Four C's]. 
371. ld. 
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an attorney to his or her client.372 By adhering to these duties, 
attorneys can help protect their clients from financial exploitation.373 
Elder law attorneys aspire "to identify who [their] client is at the 
earliest possible stage and communicate[] that information to the 
persons immediately involved.,,374 An attorney owes "professional 
duties of competence, diligence, loyalty and confidentiality" to the 
client.375 The first step to the attorney-client relationship is 
identifying the elderly client.376 "This is [particularly] important in 
Elder Law, because family members may be very involved in the 
legal concerns of [an elderly client], and they may even have a stake 
in the outcome."m Elder law attorneys "exercise care to observe 
signs of undue influence," and when undue influence appears, "take 
steps to ensure [ their client] is protected. ,,378 
To fulfill this duty, it is best that lawyers meet with their clients 
alone.379 Elder law attorneys aspire to meet with the prospective 
client "in private at the earliest possible stage so that the client's ... 
voice can be engaged unencumbered" and uninfluenced by others.38o 
Meeting with the client alone, not in the presence of a prospective 
agent, helps "ensure that the client is able to express his [ or her] own 
wishes" (not the agent's) regarding a power of attorney.381 When an 
elderly client's family members are involved, a lawyer should take 
direction from the client, not the family.382 Though it seems 
elementary, it bears saying that attorneys "should not draft powers of 
attorney . . . for non-clients who will be executing the documents," 
but should establish an "attorney-client relationship [with] the senior 
prior to execution. ,,383 
372. Id. 
373. Lemke & Moskowitz, supra note 135, at 5 (discussing how knowing and applying the 
"Four e's" of elder law ethics helps safeguard clients from financial exploitation). 
374. Nat'l Acad. of Elder Law Attorneys, Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder 
Law with Commentaries, 2 NAELA 1. 5, 7 (2005), available at 
http://www .naela.orgl App _ ThemeslPubliclPDF !Medial AspirationalStandards. pdf 
[hereinafter Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder Law]. 
375. Id. 
376. Id. 
377. Id. 
378. Id. at 12. 
379. Henningsen, supra note 365, at 26. 
380. Aspirational Standardsfor the Practice of Elder Law, supra note 374, at 8. 
38l. Henningsen, supra note 365, at 26. 
382. Betsy 1. Abramson, Ethical Considerations in Elder Law Cases, 73 WIS. LAW. 16, 16 
n.3 (2000) (citing a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney who "transferr[ed] a 
client's property on the instruction of family members only, never meeting with the 
client, because the [attorney] 'did not make house calls"'). 
383. Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder Law, supra note 374, at 10. 
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Attorneys have an ethical duty to avoid conflicts of interest.384 
"[I]n most situations, [this means that] a lawyer may only represent 
one individual.,,385 In drafting a power of attorney, a lawyer should 
identify that individual as the senior, the principal.386 "If there is no 
apparent conflict of interest, joint representation, [perhaps of 
spouses,] may be a preferred form of representation.,,387 Attorneys 
should ensure that family members understand who the clients are 
and the implications of separate or joint representation, "especially 
with respect to the attorney's obligation to keep or share 
confidences.,,388 A lawyer may also represent a fiduciary, perhaps an 
agent under power of attorney, in their fiduciary capacity.389 Elder 
law attorneys take care when representing a fiduciary to ensure the 
fiduciary is acting according to the "known wishes and best interest 
of the principal. ,,390 . 
Attorneys have a basic obligation to keep information relating to 
the representation of a client confidential unless the client consents to 
disclosure.391 Elder law attorneys aspire to explain the duty of 
confidentiality to the client and any other interested party early in the 
representation "to avoid misunderstanding[s], and to [determine] the 
client's wishes regarding disclosure of confidential information.,,392 
If a client requests disclosure, the attorney should counsel the client 
on the "possible risks and consequences of disclosure.,,393 For 
example, if a client asks the attorney to discuss the client's matter 
with only one of the client's children, the attorney should explain that 
disclosure "could raise issues of undue influence or overreaching on 
the part of that child.,,394 In sum, elder law attorneys aspire to 
"[s]trictly adhere[] to the obligation of client confidentiality, 
especially in representation that may involve frequent contacts with 
family members, care takers, or other involved parties who are not 
clients. ,,395 
384. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (2009). 
385. Understanding the Four C's, supra note 370. 
386. Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder Law, supra note 374, at 10. 
387. Id. at 10-1l. 
388. Id. at 10. 
389. Id. at 14. 
390. Id. 
391. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2009). 
392. Aspirational Standards for the Practice of Elder Law, supra note 374, at 15. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. at 16. 
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Attorneys assess and detennine a client's competency (capacity) to 
execute a particular legal document.396 There are different thresholds 
for the capacity required to complete a legal task depending on the 
type of task being undertaken.397 A client may have the capacity to 
perform some tasks but not others. 398 For example, a client might 
have the capacity to make a will but not a contract. 399 The capacity 
required to execute a power of attorney is a contractual standard.40o 
Elder law attorneys may employ certain techniques to assess and 
determine their client's capacity to accomplish a legal task. The 
attorney should use "appropriate skills and processes [to] mak[ e] and 
document[] preliminary assessments of client capacity. ,,401 The 
attorney may also "[a]dapt[] the interview environment, timing of 
meetings, communications and decision-making processes to 
maximize a client's capacities.'>402 Ultimately, the attorney should 
consider a number of factors, "including the kind of decision [being] 
made and the applicable legal standard," when determining if the 
client has the capacity required to complete the task at hand.403 Who, 
in the hypothetical "typical scenario," determined if Mrs. Smith had 
the requisite capacity to execute the power of attorney? 
Counseling the Client on Appointing Agents 
Attorneys should advise their clients regarding the need to 
select a trustworthy agent. In addition, attorneys can counsel their 
clients on the options available when two or more agents are 
appointed: co-agents acting independently, co-agents requiring 
agreement, or successor agents. The Uniform Power of Attorney Act 
396. ld. at 23. 
397. ld. at 20. 
398. ld. at 19-20. 
399. Id. at 20. 
400. "Case law consistently holds that a principal who appoints an agent under a power of 
attorney must have the capacity required to make a contract." Lawrence A. Frolik & 
Mary F. Radford, "Sufficient" Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for 
Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 313 (2006); see also Yates v. Rathbun, 984 
So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("[T]he standard for determining whether a 
person is competent to execute a power of attorney is whether that person is able to 
understand and comprehend his or her actions."); In re Guardianship of Ray, No. 657, 
1991 WL 179418, at *4 (Ohio App. Sept. 16,1991) {"Derived from contracts law, the 
test to be used to determine mental capacity [to execute a power of attorney] is the 
ability of the principal to understand the nature, scope and the extent of the business 
she is about to transact. "). 
401. Aspirational Standards/or the Practice a/Elder Law, supra note 374, at 20. 
402. ld. at 22. 
403. ld. at 21. 
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"provides several default rules that merit careful consideration by the 
principal."404 When co-agents are appointed, the default rule is that 
each agent can "exercise [his or her] authority independently.'>405 A 
"principal can override the default rule by requiring co agents to act 
by majority or unanimous consensus.',406 A requirement that co-
agents agree to actions taken under the power of attorney may 
impede its use.407 Financial institutions may be "reluctant to accept a 
power of attorney that names co-agents without proof that the co-
agents [agree to the transaction].',408 However, a requirement that co-
agents agree may be exactly what a principal intends to limit the 
possibility of exploitation by one agent.409 Attorneys help their 
clients weigh these agency options, considering the risks and benefits 
of each, and decide which one meets the client's objectives. 
Counseling the Client on Immediate and Springing Effectiveness 
"Careful planning requires considering . . . [whether an 
agent's] authority should become effective immediately or upon a 
later event such as the principal's incapacity."410 Individual client 
circumstances will dictate the need for a springing power of 
attorney.411 Springing powers of attorney are a type of safeguard 
against power of attorney abuse because they "only take[] effect in 
specified circumstances, such as [the principal's] incapacitation. ,,412 
Ensuring the Client Determines the Extent of Authority Granted to 
the Agent 
Power of attorney abuse may be avoided by limiting the authority 
granted to an agent and granting only the powers needed.413 
Principals should carefully consider the amount of power to be 
granted the agent, especially the types of authority that have the 
404. UN1F. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § III cmt. (2006). 
405. Id. § 111(a). 
406. Id. § 1 II cmt. 
407. Id. 
408. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 18. 
409. See Lemke & Moskowitz, supra note 135, at 10 (including the appointment of two 
trustworthy agents who are required to act jointly as a type of safeguard against power 
of attorney abuse). 
410. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 19. 
411. Id. at 21. 
412. Lemke & Moskowitz, supra note 135, at 10. 
413. Black, supra note 59, at 309. 
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"potential of dissipating the principal's property or altering the 
principal's estate plan.,,414 For that reason, "attorneys should 
question their elderly clients to find out exactly what he or she wishes 
the agent to do.,,415 For example, a client might want her daughter to 
make the client's monthly mortgage payment if the client undergoes 
long-term hospitalization and rehabilitation.416 Rather than draft a 
general power of attorney granting the daughter broad powers, a 
lawyer may draft a more limited power of attorney authorizing the 
daughter to pay the client's bills, but "not to cash checks, withdraw 
money, or sell [the client's] property.,,417 
The power of an agent to make unlimited gifts of the principal's 
property and assets is "exceptionally dangerous" because it allows an 
agent to make gifts the principal may not have intended.418 Lawyers 
should ask clients who want their agents to have gifting authority 
about the purpose and scope of those giftS.419 "Perhaps the client ... 
wants the[ir] agent to continue the client's pattern of providing cash 
to children and grandchildren on birthdays and holidays.,,42o The 
attorney can then draft a gifting clause for that sole purpose.421 
"Gifting clauses can be limited in other ways to protect the client 
from financial abuse[:] ... authorize[ing gifts] for the sole purpose of 
continuing an established pattern of charitable giving[,]" "clarify[ing] 
that the gifting [authority] is not to be used to change the [principal's] 
estate plan[,]" requiring that "gifts to the principal's children ... [be] 
in equal amounts and to all at the same time[,]" requiring the agent 
"to provide notice to a third party of any gifts over a certain amount" 
or to made to the agent, or requiring the agent "to obtain the consent. 
. . of the principal's children if a gift is [to be] made to the agent. ,>422 
A lawyer who counsels their client on gifting authority helps their 
client make an informed decision, and the attorney can then draft the 
document accordingly. 423 
Including Oversight Provisions 
414. Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 310, at 18. 
415. Black, supra note 59, at 309. 
416. Id. 
417. Id. 
418. Henningsen, supra note 365, at 26. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 26-27. 
423. Id. at 26. 
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By including oversight provisions, "[a ]ttorneys can increase the 
likelihood that [power of attorney] abuse [is] discovered.'>424 A 
lawyer may want to include an express accounting requirement in the 
power of attorney document.425 This provision sets forth the 
frequency with which accountings should be done and to whom the 
accountings should be provided.426 Including a requirement to 
account to a third party, in addition to the principal, may be 
"particularly important if the principal becomes incapacitated.,,427 
Another oversight provision a lawyer may detail in the power of 
attorney is one requiring the agent to keep records.428 This provision 
should specify "which records ... must [be kept] and for how 
long.,,429 It may also require the agent to turn over records to a 
designated third party if requested. 430 
Ensuring the Client and the Agent Understand the Agent's 
Responsibilities 
A lawyer should educate his or her client about the agent's 
responsibilities, "such as [a] requirement to provide ... regular 
accounting[ s] .',431 A lawyer may make the client aware of the 
"warning signs of financial abuse and [provide instructions on] what 
to do if suspicions arise," for example, revoking the power of 
attorney.432 Lawyers can also reduce the risk of exploitation "by 
educating the agent.,,433 Agents who are "aware of [their] 
responsibilities and limitations" under a power of attorney are "less 
likely to abuse [their authority].',434 Therefore, a drafting attorney 
may, with the client's consent, meet with an agent to "[d]iscuss the 
[agent's] dut[ies] owed to the principal and review the [plower of 
[a ]ttorney document[. ]"435 The drafting attorney may also include a 
statement of the agent's fiduciary duties in the power of attorney and 
424. ld. 
425. ld. at 27-28. 
426. ld. 
427. ld. at 28. 
428. ld. 
429. ld. 
430. ld. 
431. ld. 
432. ld. 
433. ld. at 25-26. 
434. ld. 
435. Jd. at 28, 77. 
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have the agent sign the statement to acknowledge the agent's 
fiduciary duties owed to his or her principal. 436 
VII. SPRINGING POWERS OF ATTORNEY PREVENT 
EXPLOITATION AND PRESERVE AUTONOMY 
A. The Balance of POA Reforms Should Tip in Favor of Preventing 
Exploitation and Preserving Autonomy 
In 1994, commentators wrote that, over the previous thirty years, 
states had reformed "durable power of attorney statutes while 
keeping in mind [the] original purpose" of the durable power as "a 
simple, inexpensive financial management tool. ,,437 Reforms had 
taken a "singular direction . . . [o]f improving the utility of the 
device. ,,438 The commentators suggested "that a more balanced 
approach [would] be required for the future. ,,439 There were few 
legal or administrative safeguards in place for potential victims of 
power of attorney abuse.440 And, in fulfilling the objective of 
"improving the usefulness of durable powers of attorney," 
policymakers had not created adequate safeguards for principals and 
had inadvertently opened the door to abuse.441 The balanced 
approach suggested by the commentators included certain protective 
reforms.442 
Twenty years later, the debate continues. Should the balance of 
power of attorney reforms tip in favor of usefulness and efficiency? 
Protecting the primary users of durable powers of attorney, the 
elderly, from financial abuse? Enhancing the autonomy of principals 
who choose to execute durable powers? This Article suggests that 
the balance of reforms should tip in favor of the latter two-
safeguards from financial abuse and preserving principal autonomy-
especially given the proliferation of fill-in-the blank power of 
attorney forms, downloadable from the Internet, and executed 
without the benefit of legal counsel. The UPOAA made strides in 
this direction with its provisions protecting against financial 
436. [d. at 26. The UPOAA statutory form contains a section explaining the agent's legal 
duties, but does not require an agent's acknowledging signature. UNIF. POWER OF 
Arr'y ACT § 301, 88 U.L.A. 250. 
437. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 1. 
438. [d. (emphasis added). 
439. [d. at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
440. [d. at 1. 
441. [d. at 24. 
442. [d. at 2-3. 
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exploitation and preserving a principal's autonomy.443 Making 
springing effectiveness of durable powers of attorney the default 
position in the UPOAA moves reforms further in the direction of 
protecting principals from abuse and preserving independent 
decision-making.444 
Springing powers of attorney serve both purposes: preventing 
financial exploitation and preserving a principal's independence.445 
In a study funded by the AARP's Public Policy Institute (AARP 
Report), staff from the American Bar Association's Commission on 
Law and Aging, AARP staff, and an advisory committee composed 
of experts in power of attorney abuse "identified 21 provisions in the 
UPOAA that protect against abuse and promote autonomy.,,446 One 
of the provisions identified in the study is "[ s ]ection 109 [of the 
UPO AA], which authorizes springing [powers of attorney] and 
provides guidance on how to determine whether the future event or 
contingency ... has occurred. ,,447 
The AARP Report points to the triggering provisions included in 
section 109 of the UPOAA as promoting principals' autonomy and 
protecting against abuse.448 When making a springing power of 
attorney, a principal can name a person, not necessarily the agent, 
"who is to determine whether the future event or contingency" (the 
principal's incapacity) has occurred.449 A principal can specify in the 
power of attorney "how th[ e] determination [of his or her incapacity] 
is to be made."450 For example, a principal might require in the 
power of attorney that "a certain trusted physician or psychologist" 
be involved in determining the principal's incapacity.451 If a principal 
is concerned about the motives of some individuals, he or she can 
exclude them from or "minimize their role in the determination of 
incapacity," and perhaps prevent abuse.452 Finally, the UPOAA 
443. ld. at 15,23. 
444. See id. 
445. See Student Note, Planning Tools Available to the Elderly Client. 19 AM. 1. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 599, 604 (1995); Harry S. Margolis, Should Your Durable Power of Attorney 
be "Springing," MARGOLIS & BLOOM, LLP (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.margolis.comlOur-Bloglbidl67214/Should-y our-Durable-Power-of-
Attorney-be-Springing. 
446. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 11. 
447. ld. at 12. 
448. ld. at 35. 
449. ld. 
450. ld. 
451. ld. at 36. 
452. ld. 
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"establishes a default mechanism" for determining a principal's 
incapacity if the principal decided not to name a person to make the 
incapacity determination or that person "is unable or unwilling to 
make [the] determination.,,453 
B. Springing Powers of Attorney Protect Against Exploitation 
The most effective remedy for power of attorney abuse is to 
prevent its occurrence.454 Once it has occurred, the likelihood of the 
victim reporting the abuse and redressing the wrong is slim at best. 455 
For the reasons discussed in Section II of this Article, financial 
exploitation often goes unreported to authorities.456 One study 
estimated that only lout of 44 cases of elder financial exploitation is 
reported to authorities.457 If power of attorney abuse is reported, as 
discussed in Section III, civil litigation and criminal prosecution do 
not provide adequate remedies for the victim.458 
Therefore, prevention and mitigation should be the focus of law 
reform efforts to protect elders from power of attorney abuse. 
Arguably, with the exception of one section in the UPOAA, the Act's 
provisions intended to protect against power of attorney abuse focus 
on the types of abuse that occur after an agent has begun acting for 
the principal.459 Springing powers of attorney prevent and mitigate 
power of attorney abuse before an agent is vested with authority to 
act. 
1. A Principal May Never Become Incapacitated 
To state the obvious: If a springing power of attorney never 
springs, there is no opportunity for an agent to misuse the power of 
attorney. It may be tempting to discount this by assuming that a 
principal who never loses capacity is not likely to be exploited, and 
conclude the preventive effect is minimal. However, durable power 
of attorney abuse is not limited to incapacitated principals. There 
453. Id. at 35-36 (showing how the default mechanism also helps prevent battles over 
determining a principal's incapacity). 
454. See id. at vii. 
455. See Fact Sheet: Elder Abuse Prevalence and Incidence, supra note 52 ("It is estimated 
that for every one case of elder abuse, neglect, exploitation, or self neglect reported to 
the authorities, about five go unreported."). 
456. See supra Part II. 
457. Under the Radar: New York State Elder Abuse Prevalence Study, supra note 56, at 50. 
458. See Stiegel & Klem, supra note 14, at 6 ("The lack of statutory clarity about agent 
duties poses challenges to civil litigation and criminal prosecution."). 
459. Id. at 5 (pointing to section 115 of the UPOAA as the one section that protects against 
abuse before an agent begins acting for a principal). 
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seems to be an incorrect assumption that power of attorney abuse 
only occurs when a principal is suffering from severe 
incapacitation.460 Principals that are not incapacitated, however, can 
be and are taken advantage of by abusive agents.461 It may be that 
more mentally and physically capable principals are exploited than 
incapacitated ones. In 1993, the Government Law Center of Albany 
Law School surveyed elder law attorneys, service providers, judges, 
and prosecutors about power of attorney abuse.462 Sixty-six percent 
of the respondents reported personal knowledge of power of attorney 
abuse incidents.463 In the majority of incidents (57 percent), the 
abuse was perpetrated "while the principal was either still competent 
or had not been adjudged incompetent.,,464 
2. Third-Party Involvement May Prevent Exploitation 
Banks and financial institutions can be the "first line of defense" in 
preventing financial abuse by detecting the abuse before an elderly 
person's assets are dissipated.465 Financial institutions are in a prime 
position to observe and report suspicious activity such as: 
• An unusual volume of banking activity. 
• Banking activity inconsistent with a customer's 
usual habits. 
• Sudden increases in incurred debt when the elder 
appears unaware of transactions. 
• Withdrawal of funds by a fiduciary or someone else 
handling the elder's affairs, with no apparent benefit 
to the elder. 
• Implausible reasons for banking activity are given 
either by the elder or by the person accompanying 
him/her.466 
Recognizing this prime position, state Adult Protective Services 
agencies and other organizations have revised their state laws to 
encourage or mandate bank personnel to report suspected elder 
460. Kohn, supra note 15, at 36. 
46l. Rhein, supra note 18, at 179 (providing examples of power of attorney abuse 
involving principals who had decision-making capacity). 
462. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 28. 
463. !d. at 37. 
464. Id. at 39. 
465. Hughes, supra note 69, at 294. 
466. Id. 
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financial exploitation.467 Other initiatives have included "bank 
reporting projects" to train bank personnel how to identify and report 
elder financial exploitation.468 
Springing powers of attorney offer another line of defense to elder 
financial exploitation. An agent under power of attorney may "make 
frequent trips to his or her [elderly principal's] bank to make deposits 
and withdrawals. ,,469 If a bank is presented with a springing power of 
attorney as authority to conduct a transaction, it should, pursuant to 
the terms of the document, determine if the springing event (the 
principal's incapacity) has occurred.470 This determination will 
typically include an inquiry with the agent regarding the principal's 
status and a request for written certification by the principal's 
physician of the principal's incapacity .471 
This process, admittedly inconvenient, may prevent an 
unscrupulous agent from conducting an abusive transaction. First, 
the bank inquiry itself may be enough to cause the agent to change 
his or her mind about pursuing the transaction. Second, the inquiry 
generates a subsequent step and the involvement of another person, 
the principal's physician, which could prevent an abusive transaction 
from occurring. The physician may consult with and examine the 
principal to determine the principal's capacity. That examination 
could result in a determination that the principal is not in fact 
incapacitated, and therefore, the agent does not have the authority to 
act. 472 And if the principal is competent, what he or she learns 
through this process will be useful in reviewing and regulating his or 
her agent's future conduct.473 
3. Springing Authority Delays an Agent's Ability to Act 
"By delaying the commencement" of an agent's authority, a 
springing power of attorney "narrows the period of time [in which a 
467. Id. at 293. 
468. Id. 
469. Black, supra note 59, at 304-05. 
470. See VNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109(b)-(c), 8B V.L.A. 197. 
471. If a springing power of attorney does not specify who should make the determination 
of the principal's incapacity, or a person has been authorized but is unable or 
unwilling to make the determination, the default rule is that the power of attorney 
"becomes effective upon a determination in a writing or other record by a physician 
[or licensed psychologist] that the principal is incapacitated .... " Id. § 109(c)(l), 8B 
U.L.A.197. 
472. Cf id. § 109(b), (c), 8B V.L.A. 197 (stating that "a determination in writing or other 
record" is necessary when the "power of attorney becomes effective upon the 
occurrence of a future event or contingency"). 
473. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the importance of choosing a trustworthy agent). 
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principal] may be subject to abuse.,,474 The following account 
illustrates how springing authority mitigates power of attorney abuse. 
One commentator tells the story of "Gladys Smith" which is "based 
on true and actual events.,,475 Shortly before undergoing a serious 
operation in 1998, Gladys appointed her family's accountant, "Tim .. 
. as her agent under [a] durable power of attorney in case she became 
incapacitated.'>476 "Gladys recovered from her operation and would 
not be incapacitated for six more years.,,477 Thus, Tim's power of 
attorney was not "activated" until 2004.478 If it had been activated 
from the time it was created in 1998, and Tim had been able to steal 
large amounts of Gladys' money earlier, she may not have had the 
resources to remain at home as long as she did.479 It was costing 
"approximately $100,000 a year for Gladys to live at home.',48o As it 
was, Tim "was charged with stealing approximately $248,000 from 
Gladys' accounts and trust" after a bank employee, concerned about 
an account overdraft, made a report to the local department of 
aging.481 
C. Springing Powers of Attorney Preserve Autonomy 
Americans "place great value on autonomy and . . . independent 
decision-making.',482 This passion for the value of freedom is 
reflected in the law in many ways. The mentally ill benefit from a 
presumption that they should be given maximum autonomy until 
their incapacity is proven in a court of law.483 The law generally 
presumes a person is "sane" unless proven to the contrary.484 In 
making a will, a person is presumed to have the capacity to execute 
the wil1.485 The burden falls on a contestant to prove the lack of 
474. Federman & Reed, supra note 40, at 23. 
475. Christiansen, supra note 39, at 383 & n.1. 
476. [d. at 386. 
477. [d. at 400. 
478. See id. 
479. [d. 
480. Id. 
481. [d. at 389. 
482. Kohn, supra note 15, at 15-16. 
483. Failinger, supra note 20, at 6. 
484. See e.g., Thomas v. Neal, 600 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Ala. 1992) ("The presumption is 
that every person is sane, until the contrary is proven."). 
485. See e.g., Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d 1139, 1147 (Ala. 2003) ("The law presumes that 
every person has the capacity to execute a will, and the burden is on the contestant to 
prove the lack of testamentary capacity." (quoting Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So. 2d 113, 
117 (Ala. 1995))). . 
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testamentary capacity.486 The same is true for powers of attorney. 
The party claiming that a principal did not have the required capacity 
to execute a power of attorney has the initial burden of showing the 
principal was incompetent,487 perhaps by clear and convincing 
evidence.488 Agency law presumes that a person who executes a 
power of attorney will retain the capacity to oversee the agent 
appointed to manage his or her affairs. 489 
Statutory defaults should likewise presume that a principal who 
executes a power of attorney will retain the capacity to manage his or 
her own financial affairs. An elderly principal's later incapacity 
should be viewed as an exception, not the rule. Immediately 
effective powers of attorney reflect an assumption that the principal is 
going to need a surrogate decision-maker in the future;490 thus, the 
emphases on granting the agent immediate authority are to facilitate 
the agent's assumption of power and to reduce the stigma a principal 
will experience upon becoming incapacitated.491 A statutory default 
making powers of attorney effective only if a principal becomes 
incapacitated reflects another assumption; namely, that the principal 
may never need a surrogate decision-maker, but if they wish to plan 
for the future possibility, the law provides a clear path to effectuate 
the principal's objectives. 
Durable powers of attorney and springing powers of attorney 
promote principal autonomy in other ways. "The [durable power of 
attorney] was developed in response to the" recognition that some 
people, especially as they age, no longer meet the "default" position 
that allows "independent decision-making and action by adults.,,492 
Durable powers of attorney enhance a principal's autonomy by 
allowing the principal to choose an agent "to act on their behalf in the 
event they later lose the ability to act for themselves.,,493 As useful as 
they are as advanced planning instruments, durable powers "are 
regularly executed in anticipation of a largely unrealized need"-the 
486. Id. 
487. See e.g., Yates v. Rathbun, 984 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ("The 
burden initially falls on the party claiming that the person who executed the power of 
attorney was incompetent when he or she executed the power of attorney."). 
488. See e.g., In re Guardianship of Ray, No. 657, 1991 WL 179418, at *7 (Ohio App. 
Sept. 16, 1991) ("The party seeking to prove mental incapacity to sign a power of 
attorney must do so by clear and convincing evidence."). 
489. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. at 10 (2006). 
490. Kohn, supra note 15, at 6. 
491. See John C. Craft, Preventing Power of Attorney Abuse: A Lawyer's Role, 75 ALA. 
LAW. 116, 120 (2014); see also Christiansen, supra note 40, at 402. 
492. Failinger, supra note 20, at 7. 
493. Rhein, supra note 18, at 167. 
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principal may never need the agent to act in his or her stead.494 
Springing powers of attorney allow a "principal to retain plenary 
power as long as [he or she] can. ,0495 And if a principal never 
becomes incapacitated, a springing power of attorney allows the 
principal to retain plenary power for the rest of their life, never 
formally ceding financial decision-making authority to another 
person.496 
A durable power of attorney "can transform the role of the 
principal within his or her family.,,497 Professor Nina Kohn 
articulates how durable powers of attorney can undermine an elderly 
principal's sense of control and lead to significant negative impacts 
on their physical and psychological well-being.498 The very act of 
executing a power of attorney gives an agent, especially an agent who 
is the adult child of an elderly principal, "a new power" and "a new 
role. ,,499 The newly executed power of attorney provides the adult 
child an "entree into the parent's financial and personal affairs" and 
"creates a situation in which the elder no longer has exclusive control 
over his or her affairs.,,50o This loss is "exacerbated by the fact that 
[elderly principals] are routinely encouraged . . . to execute broad, 
immediately effective [powers of attorney].501 Executing a springing 
power of attorney may minimize an elderly principal's loss of sense 
of control and disempowerment. By making his or her agent's 
authority effective in the future, the principal maintains control and 
with it, their role within the family. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATION 
Policymakers should travel back in time to 1964 and revisit the 
original purposes of the durable power of attorney. The drafters of 
the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests Act 
seemed preoccupied with two thoughts. First, the drafters viewed the 
durable power of attorney as an anticipatory instrument. 502 Its 
494. Kahn, supra note 15, at 26. 
495. Christiansen, supra note 39, at 403. 
496. See Craft, supra note 491, at 120. 
497. Kahn, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
498. Id. at 26-33. 
499. Id. at 26. 
500. Id. 
501. Id. at 33. 
502. See MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF A TT'y FOR SMALL PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note 
(1964) (stating that the purpose of the Model Act was to assist individuals with small 
property interests in anticipating their incapacity). 
464 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
usefulness was in its ability to plan for the future, for the possibility 
of incapacity.503 The Model Act was intended for persons "who, in 
anticipation or because of physical handicap or infirmity ... wish to 
make provision for the care of their personal or property rights or 
interests, or both when unable adequately to take care of their own 
affairs.,,504 Second, the drafters viewed the durable power of attorney 
with some suspicion.505 They were leery of completely ceding 
judicial oversight to private contract (as evidenced by involving a 
judge in the execution of the document) and were aware of the risks 
of abuse (as evidenced by setting a maximum dollar value of property 
subject to the power and providing for accountings).506 By revisiting 
1964, durable powers of attorney can reclaim their place as an 
"advance planning" tool while protecting against abuse and 
preserving the principal's autonomy. Making springing powers of 
attorney the standard should be part of the journey. 
A. Make Springing Effectiveness the Default Position in the 
Uniform Power of Attorney Act 
Section 109 in the Unifonn Power of Attorney Act should be 
revised making springing effectiveness of an agent's powers the 
default rule. Springing powers of attorney provide a type of 
protection that may actually prevent power of attorney abuse.507 The 
current protective provisions in the UPOAA focus in large part on the 
types of abuse that occur after an agent has begun acting for the 
principa1.508 As opposed to arguably ineffective "harm rules" 
intended to punish an unscrupulous agent, springing powers of 
attorney are a type of "power rule" intended to limit an agent's 
"ability to accumulate power ... in the first place.,,509 The event 
triggering an agent's accumulation of power-the principal's 
incapacity-may never occur. A financial institution may prevent an 
503. Jd. 
504. See Boxx, supra note 16, at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF 
A TT'y FOR SMALL PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (2006». 
505. See id. ("This proposal contained restrictive provisions that illustrate the tentative 
attitude of the drafting committee."). 
506. See MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATT'y FOR SMALL PROP. INTERESTS ACT §§ 1 (a)-(b), 4, 
9; Boxx, supra note 16, at 7-9. 
507. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109, 8B U.L.A. 196-97; Seal, supra note 12, at 330 
("One of the merits of the springing power as claimed by practitioners is that it 
provides more protection against abuse."). 
508. Stiegel & Klem, supra note 17, at 5. 
509. See Failinger, supra note 20, at 13-15 (discussing "hann" rules and "power" rules in 
the context of power of attorney abuse and concluding that "hann" rules have been 
largely ineffective). 
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unscrupulous agent from activating his or her power and conducting 
an abusive transaction simply by asking for proof that the principal is 
incapacitated.510 In addition, making springing effectiveness the 
standard serves the goal of enhancing a principal's autonomy. 
Springing powers preserve a principal's independence and dignity by 
allowing the principal to plan for alternative decision-making in the 
event of his or her incapacity, without ceding immediate control to 
another person. 
Statutory defaults and power of attorney forms should be premised 
on the assumption that a principal is not receiving legal advice. The 
assumption should be that the principal (perhaps, their prospective 
agent) downloaded the form from the Internet and is not seeking legal 
advice. The UPOAA drafting committee recognized the 
"proliferation of power of attorney forms" available to the public in 
deciding to include a statutory power of attorney form. 511 That 
proliferation should guide policymakers to enhance protections for 
principals. The risks associated with executing an immediately 
effective power of attorney form without legal counseling are great. 
Therefore, the default rule should be reversed making springing 
powers of attorney, which provide more protection, the standard. 
Springing powers of attorney will not be advisable for every client, 
but attorneys can always draft an immediately effective power of 
attorney based on a client's objectives and preferences. 512 As with 
other UPOAA default positions, "individual client circumstances 
[will] dictate the need for alterations.,,513 A client's preference 
dictates whether the power of attorney should be immediately 
effective or springing, and "a lawyer's guidance plays a significant 
role" in that decision.514 
Finally, making springing powers of attorney the standard will 
serve the ultimate purpose of durable powers of attorney. 
Policymakers have uniformly encouraged the use of durable powers 
of attorney as a private alternative to court-monitored guardianship.515 
Springing powers of attorney promote this purpose more so than 
immediately effective powers of attomey.516 Seniors who believe that 
510. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT §§ 109(a)-(c), 8B U.L.A. 197, 119(d)(3). 
511. See UNIF. POWER OF A TT'y ACT § 300 emt, 8B U.L.A. 250. 
512. Whitton, NaVigating, supra note 221, at 12 ("Drafting an effective power of attorney 
requires a clear understanding of the client's objectives and preferences."). 
513. Id. at 13. 
514. Id.atI4. 
515. See Seal, supra note 11, at 310. 
516. See supra Part VII.C. 
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signing a power of attorney will not significantly undermine their 
control over their own affairs are more likely to execute one.517 With 
springing powers, a principal retains not just a sense of control, but 
actual control until they need a surrogate decision-maker.518 In 
contrast, seniors who believe that signing a power of attorney will 
"cede significant control" to an agent are less likely to execute one.519 
A principal's sense of control is instantly diminished by executing an 
immediately effective power of attorney.S20 So, having the default 
authority contingent on incapacity in the future allows the senior to 
maintain control and reduces their fear of executing a durable power 
of attorney.S21 
B. Give Principals Who Use a Statutory Form a Meaningful Choice 
Between Immediate and Springing Authority 
Policymakers should also consider altering statutory power of 
attorney forms to allow a principal to choose when his or her agent's 
authority is to become effective. Forms should educate the principal 
about the options and include clearly-worded triggering language if 
the principal chooses springing effectiveness. Nevada implemented 
exactly this method when it adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney 
Act.S22 Nevada altered the UPOAA statutory form to allow a 
principal to intentionally choose springing authority.S23 The form 
instructs the principal, in the same way the UPOAA instructs the 
principal, that the power of attorney becomes effective immediately 
unless the principal states otherwise in the "Special Instructions."s24 
However, in addition to providing blank spaces under Special 
Instructions, the Nevada form includes a separate section entitled 
"Durability and Effective Date."m There, a principal is instructed to 
517. Kohn, supra note 15, at 45 (citing a study finding that individuals who reported a 
"high sense of control over their lives" were significantly more likely to execute an 
advance directive than those who reported a low sense of control). 
518. See supra Part VII.C. 
519. Kohn, supra note 15, at 45. 
520. ld. 
521. See supra Part VILe. 
522. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § I 62A.620 (West 2011). 
523. ld. 
524. Id. 
525. Id. The Nevada form seems to encourage the use of Special Instructions to clarify or 
expound upon the extent of authority granted to an agent. It adds "or other or 
additional authority granted to agent" to the generic Special Instructions title found in 
the UPOAA form. Id. The section allowing a principal to select a springing power is 
found in a separately numbered section immediately following Special Instructions. 
Id. 
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initial the clause(s) that applies, the first clause making the power 
durable.526 The second and third options allow a principal to make 
the power of attorney springing or effective at a future date certain: 
_ SPRINGING POWER. It is my intention and direction 
that my designated agent, and any person or entity that my 
designated agent may transact business with on my behalf, 
may rely on a written medical opinion issued by a licensed 
medical doctor stating that I am disabled or incapacitated, 
and incapable of managing my affairs, and that said medical 
opinion shall establish whether or not I am under a disability 
for the purpose of establishing the authority of my 
designated agent to act in accordance with this Power of 
Attorney. 
_ I wish to have this Power of Attorney become effective 
on the following date: .... 527 
The Nevada form essentially incorporates the UPOAA default rule 
of the principal's incapacity being determined and verified by a 
physician in some written form. 528 The UPOAA statutory form 
should be modified in similar fashion to allow a principal the choice 
of a springing power of attorney, and include a clear triggering 
mechanism. 
526. Id. 
527. Id. 
528. See VNIF. POWER OF ATT'y ACT § 109(c)(l), 8B V.L.A. 197 (providing the default 
rule for detennining a principal's incapacity). 
